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SORA Applies to Out of State Sex Offense

In affirming Supreme Court’s determination that petitioner (who pled nolo contendre to a sex offense in Florida and was registered as a sex offender in Florida) must register as a sex offender in New York (upon moving to New York), the Second Department wrote:

SORA provides that any “sex offender” must comply with its provisions (see Correction Law § 168-f). A “sex offender” is defined as “any person who is convicted” of a “sex offense” (Correction Law § 168-a[1], [2]). The definition of a “sex offense” with respect to an offense committed in another jurisdiction is “a conviction of [i] an offense in any other jurisdiction which includes all of the essential elements of any such crime” that constitutes a “sex offense” under SORA (Correction Law [*2]§ 168-a[2][d][i]). The statute also provides that a “sex offense” includes a “conviction of . . . [ii] a felony in any other jurisdiction for which the offender is required to register as a sex offender in the jurisdiction in which the conviction occurred” (Correction Law § 168-a[2][d][ii]). Matter of Kasckarow v Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders of State of NY, 2013 Slip Op 03485, 2nd Dept, 5-15-13

 

 

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