You are here: / / Juvenile Entitled to Petition for Special Immigrant Juvenile Status—Family...
,

Juvenile Entitled to Petition for Special Immigrant Juvenile Status—Family Court’s Ruling to the Contrary Reversed

The Second Department reversed Family Court and determined the subject child was eligible to petition for special immigrant juvenile status:

Pursuant to 8 USC § 1101(a)(27)(J) (as amended by the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub L 110-457, 122 US Stat 5044) and 8 CFR 204.11, a “special immigrant” is an undocumented resident who is, inter alia, under 21 years of age, unmarried, and “declared dependent on a juvenile court located in the United States or whom such a court has legally committed to, or placed under the custody of, an agency or department of a State, or an individual or entity appointed by a State or juvenile court located in the United States” (8 USC § 1101[a][27][J][i]). For the juvenile to qualify for SIJS status, it must be also determined that reunification with “1 or both” of the juvenile’s parents is not viable due to parental abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law (id.), and that it would not be in the juvenile’s best interest to be returned to his or her native country or country of last habitual residence (see 8 USC § 1101[a][27][J][ii]).

Based upon our independent factual review, we find that the record, which includes affidavits from Cristal and her mother, fully supports the conclusion that Cristal was abandoned by her father. Cristal never lived with her father; he visited her only once. He never provided any financial support, and failed to communicate with her. Thus, Cristal established that reunification with her father was not viable due to abandonment … . Accordingly, the Family Court should have granted Cristal’s motion. Matter of Cristal MRM, 2014 NY Slip Op 04496, 2nd Dept 6-18-14

 

You might also like
UNDER THE AGUILAR-SPINELLI ANALYSIS, THERE ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE FOR PLAINTIFF’S ARREST; THE CITY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE 42 USC 1983, FALSE ARREST, ASSAULT AND BATTERY CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
THE DEFENDANT BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN PLAINTIFF’S ACTION TO CANCEL AND DISCHARGE A MORTGAGE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; THE BANK PROVED THE DE-ACCELERATION NOTICE WAS PROPERLY TRANSMITTED TO PLAINTIFF, RENDERING THE UNDERLYING FORECLOSURE ACTION TIMELY (SECOND DEPT).
VILLAGE BOARD WAS NOT REQUIRED TO CONSIDER AN APPLICATION FOR THE AMENDMENT OF A ZONING ORDINANCE WHICH IS A LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION NOT SUBJECT TO AN ARTICLE 78 REVIEW (SECOND DEPT).
A MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW MUST BE DENIED IF IT IS BROUGHT BEFORE THE CLOSE OF THE OPPOSING PARTY’S CASE, EVEN IF THE MOTION HAS MERIT (SECOND DEPT).
PETITION TO REMOVE A TRUSTEE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT). ​
SIX TO TWELVE INCHES OF SNOW FELL OVERNIGHT AND PLAINTIFF SLIPPED AND FELL AT AROUND 6:00 AM; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO THE STORM-IN-PROGRESS DEFENSE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
THE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT’S SLIP AND FALL CALL COULD NOT BE IDENTIFIED, THE LIGHTER BURDEN OF PROOF PURSUANT TO THE NOSEWORTHY DOCTRINE DID NOT APPLY (SECOND DEPT).
Criteria for Setting Aside a Verdict As a Matter of Law and Setting Aside a Verdict As Against the Weight of the Evidence Explained

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Denial of Mother’s Request to Relocate Reversed, Factors Described Petitioner Was Not Estopped from Denying Paternity—Family Court’s...