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Rebuttal Witness Properly Called by the People to Show Possible Bias of Defense Witness

The Fourth Department, over a strong two-justice dissent, determined that a rebuttal witness called by the People was properly allowed to testify to demonstrate the bias of a defense witness.  The explanation about the relevance of the rebuttal testimony is fact-specific.  The dissenters did not see the rebuttal testimony as relevant to the defense witness’ bias and did not agree that the “bias” rationale for the rebuttal was actually raised in the trial court:

…[T]he rebuttal witness was properly called to give testimony that was relevant to the defense witness’s bias or motive to fabricate, which is not collateral … . The defense witness was defendant’s former girlfriend, and the rebuttal witness was defendant’s ex-wife, who married defendant after he and the defense witness ended their romantic relationship. In her cross-examination of the defense witness, the prosecutor attempted to show that defendant and the defense witness were romantically involved at the time of the trial, but the defense witness would admit only that she and defendant were friends, and claimed that she and defendant had been friends “all along,” i.e., they were friends even when defendant and the rebuttal witness were married. The prosecutor informed the court that she wanted to call the rebuttal witness to rebut the defense witness’s testimony that she and defendant were “friends this entire time.” We disagree with our dissenting colleagues that the rebuttal witness should not have been allowed to testify. Reading the prosecutor’s colloquy with the court on this issue, together with her cross-examination of the defense witness, we conclude that the purpose of calling the rebuttal witness was to show that defendant and the defense witness were romantically involved at the time of the trial, which the prosecutor believed could be inferred if the defense witness and defendant had not been friends when he was married to the rebuttal witness.

We also disagree with our dissenting colleagues that our affirmance of the trial court’s ruling violates People v Concepcion (17 NY3d 192). The Court of Appeals has ” construed CPL 470.15 (1) as a legislative restriction on the Appellate Division’s power to review issues either decided in an appellant’s favor, or not ruled upon, by the trial court’ ” (id. at 195). Contrary to the position of the dissent, we are not affirming on a ground that is different from that determined by the court. The court allowed the rebuttal witness to testify for the “limited purpose” of whether the defense witness and defendant were friends, and we conclude that the court’s determination was proper. We simply differ from the dissent in our interpretation of the meaning of the rebuttal witness’s testimony tending to show that the defense witness and defendant were not friends after defendant married the rebuttal witness.  People v Nicholson, 2014 NY Slip Op 04611, 4th Dept 6-20-14

 

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