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Suspended Judgment Should Not Have Been Granted in Termination-of-Parental-Rights Proceeding

The Second Department, over a partial dissent, determined Family Court should not have granted a suspended judgment in a proceeding for the termination of parental rights:

After a dispositional hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights, a court may dismiss the petition, terminate parental rights and commit guardianship to the agency, or suspend judgment for a period of up to one year (see Family Ct Act §§ 631, 633[b]). “A dispositional order suspending judgment is a dispositional alternative, upon a finding of permanent neglect, that affords a brief grace period designed to prepare the parent to be reunited with the child'” … . Although this disposition provides a parent with a “second chance,” it is appropriate only where it is also in the best interests of the children … . A suspended judgment is not appropriate where a parent has failed to gain insight into the problems which led to the children’s removal in the first instance … . Moreover, to warrant a suspended judgment, “a parent must demonstrate that progress has been made to overcome the specific problems that led to the removal of the children. Mere attempts are not sufficient” … . Matter of Chanel C, 2014 NY Slip Op 04226, 2nd Dept 6-11-14

 

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