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Contract to Share Commissions with Person Not Licensed to Sell Insurance is Illegal and Unenforceable

The Second Department determined an alleged oral agreement(with Tellkamp) to share commissions for the sale of insurance with plaintiff, who initially was not licensed to sell insurance, was unenforceable.  But, for those policies sold after plaintiff was licensed, he might be entitled to commissions under a quantum meruit theory.

At the time that the plaintiff allegedly contracted with Tellkamp and began providing services, the plaintiff was not licensed by the State of New York as an insurance broker or a licensed insurance agent appointed by Phoenix Life, and he was not licensed by the State of New Jersey as an insurance producer (see Insurance Law §§ 2103, 2104, 2112; NJ Stat Ann §§ 17:22A-29, 17:22A-28). Accordingly, he was not legally permitted to receive payment of insurance commissions, either directly from the insurers or indirectly from Tellkamp (see Insurance Law § 2114[a]; NJ Stat Ann § 17:22A-41; Ops Gen Counsel NY Ins Dept No. 07-05-23 [May 31, 2007]). The alleged contract was therefore illegal and is unenforceable … . Ziv v Tellkamp 2014 NY Slip Op 03261, 2nd Dept 5-7-14

 

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