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Rule Requiring Submission of Order or Judgment for Signature within 60 Days Applies Only When Court Directs that the Proposed Order Be Settled or Submitted for Signature

The Fourth Department determined an action had not been abandoned for failure to submit the order for signature within 60 days pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.48.  That rule applies only when the court directs a party to submit or settle an order or judgment:

…[W]e agree with plaintiff that the court erred in dismissing the complaint sua sponte pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.48. That rule provides that “[p]roposed orders or judgments . . . must be submitted for signature, unless otherwise directed by the court, within 60 days after the signing and filing of the decision directing that the order be settled or submitted . . . Failure to submit the order or judgment timely shall be deemed an abandonment of the motion or action, unless for good cause shown” (22 NYCRR 202.48 [a], [b]). As the Court of Appeals wrote, “[b]y its plain terms, section 202.48 (a) speaks to the circumstances where the court’s decision expressly directs a party to submit or settle an order or judgment” (Funk v Barry, 89 NY2d 364, 367). Thus, the Court held that “the 60-day period applies only where the court explicitly directs that the proposed judgment or order be settled or submitted for signature” (id. at 365). Here, the order of reference did not explicitly direct plaintiff to settle or submit an order or judgment for signature. Rather, it directed plaintiff to submit a “Motion or [an] Ex Parte Application” seeking a judgment of foreclosure and sale. We therefore conclude that the court erred in dismissing the complaint in reliance on 22 NYCRR 202.48… . Midfirst Bank v Bellinger, 2014 NY Slip Op 03365, 4th Dept 5-9-14

 

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