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Owners’ Intent, at the Time Plaintiff Was Injured, to Use the Property As a Second Home Triggered the Homeowners’ Exemption to Labor Law Liability Notwithstanding that the Owners Never Occupied the Property and Started Leasing It Two Years After the Accident

The First Department, over a dissent, determined that plaintiff was unable to raise a question of fact about whether defendant-homeowners intended to use the renovated house as income property,  Therefore the homeowners’ exemption under Labor Law 240(1) and 241(6) precluded recovery for injuries suffered by the plaintiff during the renovation.  The homeowners did not direct or control plaintiff’s work. The accident occurred in 2005.  One of the owners, Parry, testified that they intended to use the place as a second home.  In 2007, having never occupied the house, the owners decided to lease the house and did so.  The court determined the owners’ intent at the time of the accident in 2005 controlled:

The owners made a prima facie showing of their entitlement to the homeowner’s exemption by demonstrating that their premises consist of a one-family dwelling and that they did not direct or control plaintiff’s work … . Therefore, the burden shifted to plaintiff to “produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to establish the existence of material issues of fact which require a trial of the action” … . Plaintiff has failed to meet this burden as his arguments before this Court and the motion court are based on unfounded speculation that the owners intended to use the house solely for commercial purposes.

The availability of the homeowner’s exemption hinges upon “the site and the purpose of the work, a test which must be employed on the basis of the homeowners’ intentions at the time of the injury” … . Accordingly, plaintiff and the dissent misplace their reliance on the lease, which the owners entered into almost two years after plaintiff’s injury. Farias v Simon, 2014 NY Slip Op 07932, 1st Dept 11-18-14

 

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