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An “Administrative Evaluation,” As Opposed to a Formal Disciplinary Reprimand, Can Remain in a Teacher’s File Even though the Evaluation Was Issued In the Absence of the Formal Notice and Hearing Requirements of Education Law 3020-a

The Second Department determined an “administrative evaluation,” opposed to a formal disciplinary reprimand, could remain in a teacher’s file, even though the evaluation was issued in the absence of the formal notice and hearing procedures mandated by Education Law 3020-a:

In New York, a tenured teacher may not be “disciplined” without being afforded the procedures set forth in Education Law § 3020-a, which requires that formal charges first be referred to the board of education for a determination of probable cause, after which the teacher is given written notice of the charges and an opportunity for a hearing (Education Law § 3020; see Education Law § 3020-a). However, section 3020-a does not “insulat[e] tenured teachers from all written critical comment from their supervisors” … . While a formal disciplinary reprimand may not be issued without compliance with section 3020-a, a critical “administrative evaluation” may properly be included in a teacher’s personnel file without resort to such procedures … .

Here, the letter the petitioner sought to have removed from his personnel file “[fell] within [the] permissible range of administrative evaluation,” and the respondent Elmsford Union Free School District did not act unlawfully in making it part of the petitioner’s personnel file without complying with Education Law § 3020-a… . Matter of Weinberger v Elmsford Union Free School District, 2014 NY Slip Op -7360, 2nd Dept 10-29-14

 

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