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Conflict Between Federal and State Law Required Application of Federal Law—Carrier of “Household Goods” Not Entitled to Tax Exemptions Allowed by State Law but Not Allowed by Federal Law

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Egan, determined the narrower definition of “household goods” in federal law preempted the broader definition in state law (Transportation Law; Tax Law).  Petitioner, a moving company, was therefore not entitled to exemptions from the state tax law for carriers of “household goods” based on the state definition:

…[T]his matter presents an instance of conflict preemption, which occurs when “compliance with both federal and state [law] is a physical impossibility,” or where the state law at issue — here, Transportation Law § 2 (15) and its corresponding impact upon the availability of the exemption set forth in Tax Law § 504 (5) — “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress” … .

Simply put, the federal and state definitions of household goods stand in direct conflict with one another and, consistent with the doctrine of conflict preemption, the more expansive definition of household goods set forth in Transportation Law § 2 (15) (b) and (c) must yield to its more restrictive federal counterpart. To hold otherwise would frustrate Congress’ long-standing regulation of this particular aspect of interstate commerce. Accordingly, in order to avail itself of the exemption embodied in Tax Law § 504 (5), petitioner — as a federally registered motor carrier engaged in the interstate transport of household goods — must demonstrate that its shipments qualify as household goods within the meaning of 49 USC § 13102 (10) (A) and (B). Matter of Atlas Van Lines Inc v Tax Appeals Trib of the State of New York, 2014 NY Slip Op 07219, 3rd Dept 10-23-14

 

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