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People Did Not Meet Their Burden of Demonstrating Developmentally Disabled Respondent, Who Had Been In the Care and Custody of the OPWDD Since His Acquittal of a Criminal Charge By Reason of Mental Disease or Defect, Was “Mentally Ill”—Respondent’s Release Was Appropriate

Respondent is mildly developmentally disabled and was committed to the care and custody of the Office for People with Developmental Disabilities (OPWDD) after acquittal of a criminal charge by reason of mental disease or defect.  The Third Department determined Supreme Court properly ruled respondent could be released to a supervised intermediate care facility subject compliance with a service plan.  The court determined the People did not meet their burden of proving respondent met the relevant statutory definition of “mentally ill,” i.e., the definition which applies to the developmentally disabled:

If the court finds that a person committed pursuant to CPL 330.20 does not have a dangerous mental disorder but is mentally ill, that person must be confined in a nonsecure facility (see CPL 330.20 [12]…). If the court finds that the person is no longer mentally ill, it must release the person with an order of conditions (see CPL 330.20 [12]…). For purposes of CPL 330.20, a person with a developmental disability is considered “mentally ill” if he or she “is in need of care and treatment as a resident in the in-patient services of a developmental center or other residential facility for the . . . developmentally disabled under the jurisdiction of [OPWDD]” (CPL 330.20 [1] [d]). The DA had the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that respondent met the statutory definition of a “mentally ill” person (see CPL 330.20 [12]…]). * * *

…[T]he statute provides a different definition of “mentally ill” for individuals who have developmental disabilities in addition to one or more diagnosed mental disorders (see CPL 330.20 [1] [d]). For those individuals with developmental disabilities, the statute does not require that their judgment be so impaired by a mental illness that they are “unable to understand the need for such care and treatment” (CPL 330.20 [1] [d]); this makes sense, as such inability could be related to developmental disabilities as opposed to mental illness. Even if that additional factor applied here, however, respondent acknowledged in his testimony that he needed constant supervision, indicating that he understood the need for care and treatment. While the DA’s expert disagreed that respondent had any such understanding, Supreme Court found respondent credible and did not rely on that expert’s testimony. Thus, even under the definition of mentally ill that applies to individuals without developmental disabilities, the DA did not meet his burden. Matter of Arto ZZ, 2014 NY Slip Op 07053, 3rd Dept 10-16-14

 

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