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Petitioner, Who Was Sentenced to Death in Federal Court, Could Not Be Declared “Civilly Dead” Pursuant to the Civil Rights Law—Paternity Petition Should Not Have Been Dismissed

The Second Department reversed Family Court’s dismissal of an inmate’s petition for a declaration of paternity.  The petitioner had been sentenced to death in federal court.  Civil Rights Law 79-a, which declares anyone sentenced to life imprisonment in state court “civilly dead,” was the basis of Family Court’s ruling.  The Second Department would not extend the reach of the statute to a death sentence in federal court:

Contrary to the Family Court’s determination, the civil death provision of Civil Rights Law § 79-a(1) does not apply to the petitioner since he was sentenced to death in federal court, rather than state court … . Moreover, although Civil Rights Law § 79-a(1) declares civilly dead any person sentenced to imprisonment for life, it contains no provision pertaining to a person subject to a sentence of death, and it is not for the courts to expand terms beyond the plain language of statutes … . Matter of Ronell W v Nancy G, 2014 NY Slip OP 06987, 2nd Dept 10-15-14

 

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