Victim’s Mother Should Not Have Been Allowed to Speak at Sentencing Because Defendant Convicted Only of Possession of Weapon, Not the Killing of the Victim/Failure to Inform Defendant of Pending Criminal Charges Against Prosecution Witnesses Not Error

The Third Department vacated defendant’s sentence because the victim’s mother was allowed to speak at sentencing.  Defendant was convicted only of possession of a weapon and not the killing of the victim.  The Third Department also noted that the failure to inform the defendant of pending charges against three prosecution witnesses was not a Rosario violation and was not otherwise required under the facts:

…[W]e find that County  Court abused  its discretion in allowing [the victim’s] mother  to speak at the sentencing hearing. There is no victim of the crime upon which defendant was convicted, as criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree requires only the possession of a firearm by  a person previously convicted of a crime … . Here, defendant’s conviction upon this charge was supported by evidence wholly separate from the circumstances surrounding [the victim’s] death, as [a witness] testified that he had provided the handgun to defendant the day prior.It was thus error to allow the mother to give a statement in which she described defendant as a “killer” who “got away with murder.” Moreover, we find merit in defendant’s contention, though not preserved …, that despite promising it would not consider the mother’s statement in imposing sentence, County Court may have considered the homicide charges when it sentenced him to the statutory maximum prison sentence of 3½ to 7 years.    As defendant contends, from a review of the sentencing transcript, it appears that the court improperly attributed guilt for [the victim’s] death to him.  *  *  *

The People’s failure to inform defendant of criminal charges pending against three prosecution witnesses does not constitute a Rosario violation … .  We  further note that two of these individuals did not  testify at trial…, and  disclosure regarding the disorderly conduct charge against the third …was not statutorily required, as the People were unaware  of that recent charge at the time of trial (see CPL 240.45 [1] [c];…).    Contrary to defendant’s contention, it is not reasonable under the circumstances here presented to impute knowledge of that pending charge to the entire District Attorney’s office.  People v Sheppard, 103880/104958, 3rd Dept, 6-20-13