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Sheriff’s Deputy’s Driving During an Emergency Operation Did Not Rise to the “Reckless Disregard” Standard for Liability

The Third Department determined summary judgment was properly granted in favor of the sheriff's department because the conduct of the sheriff's deputy (Curry) involved in the vehicle accident did not meet the “reckless disregard” standard for vehicles involved in “emergency operations.”  The accident happened when the deputy made a U-turn because he noticed a police officer who appeared to be “having trouble with” a detained suspect:

“Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 (a) exempts the drivers of authorized emergency vehicles from the requirements of certain traffic laws when they are 'involved in an emergency operation'” … . This statutory qualified immunity “precludes the imposition of liability for otherwise privileged conduct except where the conduct rises to the level of recklessness” … . By statute, “[e]very . . . police vehicle” is an “authorized emergency vehicle” within the meaning of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 (a) and (b) (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 101 [emphasis added]), and the fact that Curry's police vehicle was unmarked does not compel a contrary conclusion (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 101…), although it may be relevant to the inquiry into whether he acted recklessly … .

We further find that Curry was exempt from certain traffic laws because he was engaged in an “emergency operation” (Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 114-b, 1104 [a]…). Specifically, among other privileges, Curry was entitled to “[d]isregard regulations governing directions of movement or turning in specified directions” (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 [b] [4]) and to “[s]top” his vehicle regardless of other traffic laws (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 [b] [1]). Thus, while U-turns were not permitted at this location, Curry was permitted to stop or slow his vehicle in traffic and to make a U-turn, provided he did not act recklessly … . The evidence is undisputed that Curry, having acted to assist an officer who appeared to be having trouble with a detained suspect, was undertaking an “emergency operation.”  Jones v Albany County Sheriff's Dept, 2014 NY Slip Op 08895, 3rd Dept 12-18-14

 

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