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Motion to Vacate Pursuant to CPLR 5015 Should Have Been Granted On “Subject Matter Jurisdiction” and “Fraud Upon the Court” Grounds

In a full-fledged opinion by Justice Centra, the Fourth Department determined Wells Fargo had either perpetrated a fraud upon the court or failed to reveal all the facts to the court which granted a nunc pro tunc order adding a second parcel to a foreclosure action. The Fourth Department noted that Wells Fargo knew the foreclosure action did not relate to the second parcel and therefore knew the nunc pro tunc order purporting merely to correct a mistake should not have been granted:

First, we agree … that the court … should have granted the motion to vacate the nunc pro tunc order because the court … was without subject matter jurisdiction to issue the nunc pro tunc order (see CPLR 5015 [a] [4]). Wells Fargo moved for the nunc pro tunc order pursuant to CPLR 2001, which provides that a “court may permit a mistake, omission, defect or irregularity . . . to be corrected, upon such terms as may be just, or, if a substantial right of a party is not prejudiced, the mistake, omission, defect or irregularity shall be disregarded.” The court erred in granting the nunc pro tunc motion because Wells Fargo was not seeking to correct a mere ministerial or clerical mistake… . * * *

…[W]e agree … that the court … also should have granted the motion to vacate the nunc pro tunc order based on “fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party” (CPLR 5015 [a] [3]…).. In its nunc pro tunc motion, Wells Fargo asserted that the “common address” of 124-128 East Main Street contained both Parcel No. 1 and Parcel No. 2. Wells Fargo failed to advise the court …., however, that the metes and bounds descriptions of the two parcels are different. Wells Fargo does not dispute that, “when there is a discrepancy between the street address and the legal description of a piece of real property, the legal description controls” … . Wells Fargo also failed to advise the court of the second mortgage that encumbered Parcel No. 2, which, as noted earlier, was executed on the same date as the first mortgage. Further, Wells Fargo failed to advise the court that there was a two-family dwelling on Parcel No. 1 and a separate four-family dwelling on Parcel No. 2. Had Wells Fargo made the court aware of those facts, the court may have realized that there was no clerical error in omitting Parcel No. 2 from schedule A. Wells Fargo Bank NA … v Podeswik…, 81, 4th Dept 2-14-14

 

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