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Snow Removal Contractor Owed Duty to Slip and Fall Plaintiff

The Second Department determined plaintiff in a slip and fall case was owed a duty of care by a snow-removal contractor.  The Second Department explained the relevant law and its application to the facts of the case as follows:

“As a general rule, a limited contractual obligation to provide snow removal services does not render the contractor liable in tort for the personal injuries of third parties” .. . “However, in Espinal v Melville Snow Contrs. (98 NY2d 136), the Court of Appeals identified three situations where a party who enters into a contract to render services may be said to have assumed a duty of care and thus be potentially liable in tort to third persons: (1) where the contracting party, in failing to exercise reasonable care in the performance of its duties, launches an instrument of harm or creates or exacerbates a hazardous condition, (2) where the plaintiff detrimentally relies on the continued performance of the contracting party’s duties, and (3) where the contracting party has entirely displaced the other party’s duty to maintain the premises safely (id. at 140)” … .

Here, the plaintiff demonstrated her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability… [—-] the defendant’s oral agreement with the property owner constituted a comprehensive and exclusive contractual obligation for the defendant to maintain the exterior of the subject premises and to clear the parking lot and walkways of snow and ice. This was sufficient to support a duty of care running from the defendant to the plaintiff based on the defendant’s displacement of the property owner’s duty to maintain the premises safely… . Sarisohn v Plaza Realty Servs Inc, 2013 NY Slip Op 05741, 2nd Dept 8-28-13

 

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