You are here: / / Driver of Middle Car in Chain Collision May Not Be Negligent

Driver of Middle Car in Chain Collision May Not Be Negligent

The Second Department explained the status of the “middle car” in a “chain” rear-end collision. The driver of a vehicle which is struck from behind and pushed into the rear of plaintiff’s vehicle may not be negligent:

“The driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicles and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway” (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129[a]…). Hence, a rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle, thereby requiring that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision … . In chain collision accidents, the operator of the middle vehicle may establish prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the middle vehicle was struck from behind by the rear vehicle and propelled into the lead vehicle … .Here, in support of her motion, the plaintiff submitted evidence including the deposition testimony of the defendant driver, who testified that an unidentified vehicle struck his vehicle in the rear, causing his vehicle to move forward and strike the rear of the plaintiff’s vehicle. This testimony revealed the existence of a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant driver was at fault in the happening of the accident … . Kuris v El Sol Contr & Contr Corp, 2014 NY Slip Op 02268, 2nd Dept 4-2-14

 

You might also like
ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF WAS WORKING ON DEFENDANT’S PRIVATE RESIDENCE WHEN INJURED, THE HOMEOWNER’S EXEMPTION TO LABOR LAW 241(6) LIABILITY MAY NOT APPLY BECAUSE PLAINTIFF WAS EMPLOYED AS A CARPENTER BY DEFENDANT AND DEFENDANT MAY HAVE BEEN DIRECTING AND SUPERVISING THE WORK; SIMILARLY, DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO DISMISSAL OF THE LABOR LAW 200 AND COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT).
THE PROBATION CONDITION REQUIRING DEFENDANT TO CONSENT TO SEARCHES FOR DRUGS AND WEAPONS WAS NOT REASONABLY RELATED TO HIS REHABILITATION FOR DISORDERLY CONDUCT; THE APPEAL WAIVER WAS INVALID (SECOND DEPT).
Criteria for Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Cause of Action (Where Documentary Evidence Submitted) Explained—Criteria for Motion to Dismiss Based on Documentary Evidence Explained—Pleading Requirements for Legal Malpractice Explained
LAW OFFICE FAILURE EXCUSE WAS SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO VACATE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENTS, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).
DEFENDANT PROPERTY OWNER FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE IT WAS THE ALTER EGO OF PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER OR THAT PLAINTIFF WAS DEFENDANT’S SPECIAL EMPLOYEE; THEREFORE PLAINTIFF’S PERSONAL INJURY ACTION WAS NOT PRECLUDED BY THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY ASPECT OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW (SECOND DEPT).
Family Court Should Have Determined Child Eligible to Apply for Special Immigrant Juvenile Status
A LATE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE ALLOWED WHERE, AS HERE, DISCOVERY WAS NOT COMPLETE AT THE TIME THE MOTION WAS DUE AND THE DISCOVERY IS ESSENTIAL TO THE MOTION (SECOND DEPT).
ACTION ALLEGING LEAD POISONING IN UTERO FROM FATHER’S CLOTHES WHICH WERE SATURATED WITH LEAD AND OTHER HAZARDOUS MATERIALS AT WORK DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Brutality of Offense Warranted an Upward Departure in SORA Proceeding A Forged Deed Is Void Ab Initio and Conveys Nothing to a Bona Fide Purchaser...