Denial of For Cause Juror Challenges Required Reversal

After determining one of the counts of the sex-offense indictment must be dismissed as duplicitous because more than one offense was alleged to have taken place during the  time period described in the count, the Third Department reversed defendant’s conviction finding that for cause challenges to jurors should have been granted:

It is well established that “a prospective juror whose statements raise a serious doubt regarding the ability to be impartial must be excused unless the juror states unequivocally on the record that he or she can be fair and impartial” … . When a juror’s impartiality is in doubt, it is the court’s obligation to make further inquiries and to excuse the juror if the doubt is not fully dispelled … . In this respect, the court should err on the side of disqualification, as “the worst [it] will have done in most cases is to have replaced one impartial juror with another impartial juror” (…see CPL 270.20 [1] [b]; [2]…). Conversely, the denial of a challenge for cause to a biased juror calls fundamental fairness into question and “casts a doubt on the legitimacy of the verdict even before the trial begins” … .Here, one juror stated that his job experience as a correction officer “might” affect his ability to be impartial; when asked whether his employment would prevent him from applying “basic principles” granting certain rights to defendant, he responded, “It may.” A second juror said that her husband’s employment in law enforcement “could” cause her to give greater weight to a police officer’s testimony, and a third juror said that he could not “guarantee” that he would follow an instruction not to grant greater weight to such testimony. A fourth juror stated that her husband’s work as a sheriff’s deputy would”[p]ossibly” cause her to hesitate in providing defendant his constitutional protections; she further confirmed that she would be reluctant to apply the presumption of innocence. A fifth juror said that she believed that children who accused parents of sexual abuse could not lie, and a sixth juror agreed with other jurors that it was “highly unlikely” that a child would lie about this subject, and that it was probable that such a charge must be true because of its seriousness. Finally, a seventh juror expressed doubt when asked whether she would draw an adverse inference from a defendant’s choice not to testify, explaining that “it brings the question up why wouldn’t you[?]” Although she stated that she would follow the judge’s instructions in this regard, she added that she could not “control myself to take something that’s already in my mind away.” The prosecutor advised County Court that at least one of these jurors required rehabilitation because of such expressions of uncertainty, stating that “there should be inquiry from the court. “Nevertheless, the jurors were not questioned further, and none made “unequivocal assertion[s] of impartiality”… . People v Russell, 105083, 3rd Dept 4-3-14