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SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE STAYED THE ENFORCEMENT OF PLAINTIFFS’ JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO CPLR 5240 BASED ON COUNTERCLAIMS ASSERTED BY DEFENDANTS, ACTION ON THE COUNTERCLAIMS COULD PROCEED DESPITE ENFORCEMENT OF THE JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a “summary judgment in lieu of complaint” action on a note, determined Supreme Court should not have stayed the enforcement of a judgment because defendants had asserted counterclaims. The counterclaims could proceed despite enforcement of the judgment:

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The Supreme Court erred in, upon renewal and reargument, staying enforcement of a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. Pursuant to CPLR 5240, a court may, on its own initiative or on motion, stay the enforcement of a judgment. The purpose of this “broad discretionary power” is to permit the trial court to ” prevent unreasonable annoyance, expense, embarrassment, disadvantage, or other prejudice to any person or the court'” … . Here, that the defendants remain free to assert their counterclaims against the plaintiffs in a separate action does not preclude enforcement of the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants. The defendants proffered no evidence that permitting the plaintiffs to enforce the judgment would cause unreasonable annoyance, expense, embarrassment, disadvantage, or other prejudice. Castle Restoration & Constr., Inc. v Castle Restoration, LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 07703, Second Dept 11-8-17

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE STAYED THE ENFORCEMENT OF PLAINTIFFS’ JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO CPLR 5240 BASED ON COUNTERCLAIMS ASSERTED BY DEFENDANTS, ACTION ON THE COUNTERCLAIMS COULD PROCEED DESPITE ENFORCEMENT OF THE JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))/JUDGMENT, STAY OF ENFORCEMENT (SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE STAYED THE ENFORCEMENT OF PLAINTIFFS’ JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO CPLR 5240 BASED ON COUNTERCLAIMS ASSERTED BY DEFENDANTS, ACTION ON THE COUNTERCLAIMS COULD PROCEED DESPITE ENFORCEMENT OF THE JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 5240 (STAY OF ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENT, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE STAYED THE ENFORCEMENT OF PLAINTIFFS’ JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO CPLR 5240 BASED ON COUNTERCLAIMS ASSERTED BY DEFENDANTS, ACTION ON THE COUNTERCLAIMS COULD PROCEED DESPITE ENFORCEMENT OF THE JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))/STAY OF ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENT  (SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE STAYED THE ENFORCEMENT OF PLAINTIFFS’ JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO CPLR 5240 BASED ON COUNTERCLAIMS ASSERTED BY DEFENDANTS, ACTION ON THE COUNTERCLAIMS COULD PROCEED DESPITE ENFORCEMENT OF THE JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))

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