You are here: / / PROSECUTOR’S REPEATED USE OF THE TERM ‘STATUTORY RAPE’...
,

PROSECUTOR’S REPEATED USE OF THE TERM ‘STATUTORY RAPE’ TO GIVE THE JURY THE MISIMPRESSION THE VICTIM OF THE SHOOTING IN THIS MANSLAUGHTER CASE HAD NOT BEEN CHARGED WITH A VIOLENT RAPE DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL BECAUSE DEFENDANT WAS RELYING ON THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant's manslaughter conviction, determined the prosecutor's repeated use of the term “statutory rape” to describe the charge against the victim deprived the defendant of a fair trial. The defendant raised the justification defense. Defendant had been working with the police to capture the victim, who had confessed to the defendant he was wanted for rape. Defendant shot the victim when he was attempting to turn the victim over to the police. By using the term “statutory rape,” the jury was given the mistaken impression that the rape was not a violent offense:

The County Court correctly determined that the use of the term “statutory rape” when describing the victim's alleged criminal conduct was not proper as such a colloquial term may have been misinterpreted by some jurors to mean that the sexual contact between the victim and his alleged victim was consensual, but illegal solely because of the age difference between them. Indeed, the People had initially contended to the County Court that the crime for which the victim was charged, rape in the second degree… , was not a “violent” crime. Here, because the defendant's defense was based on justification, the County Court was properly concerned that use of the term “statutory rape” by the prosecutor may have been interpreted by jurors to imply that the victim was not violent, and thus properly instructed the potential jurors that the victim was a fugitive charged with rape in the second degree. However, the court's failure to issue curative instructions to the entire jury pool, including those already sworn and seated, was error and deprived the defendant of his fundamental right to a fair trial … . People v Carlson, 2018 NY Slip Op 05859, Second Dept 8-22-18

CRIMINAL LAW (PROSECUTOR'S REPEATED USE OF THE TERM 'STATUTORY RAPE' TO GIVE THE JURY THE MISIMPRESSION THE VICTIM OF THE SHOOTING IN THIS MANSLAUGHTER CASE HAD NOT BEEN CHARGED WITH A VIOLENT RAPE DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL BECAUSE DEFENDANT WAS RELYING THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE (SECOND DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, PROSECUTOR'S REPEATED USE OF THE TERM 'STATUTORY RAPE' TO GIVE THE JURY THE MISIMPRESSION THE VICTIM OF THE SHOOTING IN THIS MANSLAUGHTER CASE HAD NOT BEEN CHARGED WITH A VIOLENT RAPE DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL BECAUSE DEFENDANT WAS RELYING THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE (SECOND DEPT))/PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT  (PROSECUTOR'S REPEATED USE OF THE TERM 'STATUTORY RAPE' TO GIVE THE JURY THE MISIMPRESSION THE VICTIM OF THE SHOOTING IN THIS MANSLAUGHTER CASE HAD NOT BEEN CHARGED WITH A VIOLENT RAPE DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL BECAUSE DEFENDANT WAS RELYING THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE (SECOND DEPT))

You might also like
THE JURY RENDERED A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF, FINDING THAT DEFENDANT UNDULY INFLUENCED DECEDENT TO NAME HIM AS THE SOLE BENEFICIARY OF TWO BROKERAGE ACCOUNTS; THE CONCLUSORY AND SPECULATIVE PROOF OF UNDUE INFLUENCE DID NOT SUPPORT THE VERDICT; DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
Landlord Failed to Demonstrate Assault on Tenant Was Not Foreseeable—Landlord’s Summary Judgment Motion Properly Denied
THE EXECUTIVE ORDERS SUSPENDING OR MODIFYING THE LAW IN RESPONSE TO COVID-19 TOLLED THE TIME-LIMIT FOR FILING AN APPEAL UNTIL WITHIN 30 DAYS OF NOVEMBER 2, 2020 (SECOND DEPT).
THE BROKER WAS THE PROCURING CAUSE OF THE SALE OF THE REAL PROPERTY AND THEREFORE WAS ENTITLED TO THE AGREED 4% COMMISSION (SECOND DEPT).
A PLAINTIFF FACED WITH A MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION NEED NOT SUBMIT ANY EVIDENCE OR AFFIDAVITS IN OPPOSITION BUT RATHER CAN STAND ON THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE COMPLAINT (SECOND DEPT).
FAMILY COURT COULD NOT ALLOW VISITATION WHILE A CRIMINAL ORDER OF PROTECTION IS IN PLACE.
IT WAS THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE (ALTHOUGH HIGHLY UNLIKELY) THE TWO ASSAULT CONVICTIONS WERE BASED UPON THE SAME ACT, DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GIVEN CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES.
AS LONG AS PLAINTIFF TAKES SOME ACTION THAT WOULD LEAD TO ENTRY OF A DEFAULT JUDGMENT WITHIN ONE YEAR AND NINETY DAYS OF THE DEFAULT, THE ACTION SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED AS ABANDONED (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

ANONYMOUS PHONE CALL DESCRIBING ‘A MAN WITH A GUN’ AND DESCRIBING... CITY DEMONSTRATED IT DID NOT HAVE PRIOR WRITTEN NOTICE OF A POTHOLE WHICH PLAINTIFF...