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NO EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION FUND TO WHICH ATTORNEY’S CHARGING LIEN COULD ATTACH.

The Second Department explained when an attorney’s charging lien can be imposed in divorce proceedings:

“A charging lien is a security interest in the favorable result of litigation, giving the attorney equitable ownership interest in the client’s cause of action and ensuring that the attorney can collect his fee from the fund he has created for that purpose on behalf of the client” (… see Judiciary Law § 475). In a matrimonial action, a charging lien will be available “to the extent that an equitable distribution award reflects the creation of a new fund by an attorney greater than the value of the interests already held by the client” … . However, “[w]here the attorney’s services do not create any proceeds, but consist solely of defending a title or interest already held by the client, there is no lien on that title or interest” … .

In this case, the plaintiff and the defendant already owned the marital residence jointly as tenants by the entirety. Thus, the parties’ settlement agreement merely permitted the plaintiff to retain her existing interest in the marital residence. “Although the nature of the property was converted from realty into dollars, her interest remained the same. Thus, no equitable distribution fund to which a charging lien can attach was created by the efforts of the [plaintiff’s] attorney” … . Charnow v Charnow, 2015 NY Slip Op 09241, 2nd Dept 12-16-15

MONTHLY COMPILATION INDEX ENTRIES:

ATTORNEYS (CHARGING LIEN IN MATRIMONIAL ACTIONS)/FAMILY LAW (ATTORNEY’S CHARGING LIEN IN MATRIMONIAL ACTIONS)/CHARGING LIEN (MATRIMONIAL ACTIONS)

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