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PLAINTIFF, WHO SOLD GOODS TO NEW JERSEY COMPANIES FOR WHICH IT WAS NOT FULLY PAID, FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE NEW YORK JURISDICTION; FACTS PLED DID NOT DEMONSTRATE LONG-ARM JURISDICTION; SITUS OF THE INJURY WAS NEW JERSEY, NOT NEW YORK.

The First Department determined plaintiff did not demonstrate New York jurisdiction under the long arm statute (CPLR 302(a)(1) or under the statute imposing jurisdiction based on an out-of-state tort causing injury in New York (CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii)). Plaintiff allegedly sold goods to two New Jersey companies for which plaintiff was not fully paid.  The assets of the two New Jersey companies were allegedly sold to a European company. Plaintiff alleged the transfer to the European company was a fraudulent conveyance. In finding both jurisdictional arguments lacking, the court wrote:

… [T]he purchase and sale transaction, whereby this in-state plaintiff shipped goods to the out-of-state defendants, who then failed to fully pay for the goods, is “[t]he classic instance in which personal jurisdiction is found not to exist” … . Plaintiff has offered nothing but conclusory assertions to support long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1). * * *

The court also properly rejected plaintiff’s assertion of jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii), for an alleged tort committed without the state causing injury within the state. As to the tort committed without the state, plaintiff points to the alleged fraudulent conveyance …. This fails, however, because the “the situs of the injury is the location of the original event which caused the injury, not the location where the resultant damages are subsequently felt” … . Thus, this alleged tortious act did not cause injury within New York, but in New Jersey. Plaintiff has also offered nothing but conclusory allegations that any defendant “derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce,” as required for jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii). Cotia (USA) Ltd. v Lynn Steel Corp., 2015 NY Slip Op 09169, 1st Dept 12-10-15

CIVIL PROCEDURE (LONG-ARM JURISDICTION NOT DEMONSTRATED, SALE OF GOODS TO COMPANIES IN NEW JERSEY)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (JURISDICTION BASED UPON SITUS OF THE INJURY NOT DEMONSTRATED)/JURISDICTION (LONG-ARM JURISDICTION AND JURISDICTION BASED UPON SITUS OF THE INJURY NOT DEMONSTRATED)/LONG-ARM JURISDICTION (SALE OF GOODS TO OUT-OF-STATE BUYER NOT SUFFICIENT)/SITUS OF INJURY JURISDICTION (SITUS OF INJURY FROM ALLEGED FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE WAS NOT NEW YORK)

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