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Registered Voter Could Not Intervene In Suit to Determine Constitutionality of Local Term-Limit Law

The Second Department affirmed Supreme Court’s denial of a “registered voter’s” [Nichol’s] motion to intervene in an action to determine the constitutionality of a local law concerning term limits for public offices.  The court explained:

Upon a timely motion, a person is permitted to intervene in an action as of right when, among other things, “the representation of the person’s interest by the parties is or may be inadequate and the person is or may be bound by the judgment” (CPLR 1012[a][2]…). Additionally, the court, in its discretion, may permit a person to intervene, inter alia, “when the person’s claim or defense and the main action have a common question of law or fact” (CPLR 1013). ” However, it has been held under liberal rules of construction that whether intervention is sought as a matter of right under CPLR 1012(a), or as a matter of discretion under CPLR 1013 is of little practical significance [and that] intervention should be permitted where the intervenor has a real and substantial interest in the outcome of the proceedings'” … .

Here, contrary to Nichols’s contention, the Supreme Court properly denied his motion for leave to intervene in the action as a defendant. Although Nichols, who describes himself as a “registered voter in the County of Suffolk and an active supporter of [his] constitutional right to pass and enforce term limit legislation,” may indeed be interested in defending the local law in question, he failed to demonstrate that he has a “real and substantial interest” in the action … . Moreover, as the Supreme Court appropriately noted, he failed to show that any interest he did have would not be adequately represented by the defendant … . Accordingly, the court properly denied Nichols’s motion for leave to intervene. Spota v County of Suffolk, 2013 NY Slip Op 06558, 2nd Dept 10-9-13

 

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