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Homeowner’s Exception Did Not Apply to a Horse Barn Used for Commercial Purposes Despite Presence of an Apartment in the Barn

The Second Department determined the “homeowner’s exception” to the applicability of the Labor Law did not apply to a barn used to house horses for commercial purposes, even though the barn included an apartment used by one of the horse farm’s shareholders. The court also noted that the “recalcitrant worker” affirmative defense should not have been dismissed “sua sponte” in the absence of a motion to dismiss it.  With respect to the homeowner’s exception, the court explained:

“… [T]he plaintiff met his prima facie burden of demonstrating that he was not performing work at a residence within the meaning of the homeowner’s exemption under Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) … . Among other things, the plaintiff demonstrated that the defendant described itself as “essentially . . . a business for keeping horses,” its owners were extensively involved in both keeping and racing horses, and approximately eight horses were boarded at the subject property at the time of the accident. The plaintiff’s submissions also established that when the defendant corporation originally purchased the subject property, the large barn was in a state of disrepair. The defendant renovated the large barn and added many improvements to the property, including multiple paddocks, an additional barn, and an “Equicisor,” a “72-foot circular automated horse exercising machine.” One of the defendant’s shareholders described the apartment in the rear of the barn as a part-time “office residence” where he might stay a ‘few days’ per week, although the amount of time he stayed varied depending on the season and the horse racing schedule. Under these circumstances, the plaintiff established, prima facie, that the defendant’s boarding stable, which was used primarily for commercial purposes, did not constitute a residence within the meaning of the homeowner’s exemption …”. Rossi v Flying Horse Farm, Inc., 2015 NY Slip Op 06798, 2nd Dept 9-16-15

 

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