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Supreme Court Should Not Have Denied Plaintiffs’ Motion to Extend the 90-Day Period for Filing a Note of Issue

In finding Supreme Court abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ motion to extend the 90-day period for filing a note of issue, the Second Department explained the analytical criteria:

Once the plaintiffs were in receipt of the 90-day notice, they were required to serve and file a timely note of issue, or move before the default date to either vacate the 90-day notice or extend the 90-day period pursuant to CPLR 2004 … . Here, there is no dispute that the plaintiffs timely moved, inter alia, to extend the 90-day period. However, notwithstanding the plaintiff’s timely motion, the Supreme Court directed the dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3216. This was an improvident exercise of discretion.

The determination as to whether to vacate a 90-day notice and grant an extension of time to file a note of issue lies within the court’s discretion, and this determination may be guided by the length of the delay in prosecuting the action, the reason for the delay, the prejudice to the defendants, and whether the moving party was in default before seeking the extension … . The Court of Appeals has observed that CPLR 3216 is “extremely forgiving” …, in that it “never requires, but merely authorizes, the Supreme Court to dismiss a plaintiff’s action based on the plaintiff’s unreasonable neglect to proceed” … . Amos v Southampton Hosp., 2015 NY Slip Op 06700, 2nd Dept 9-2-15

 

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