You are here: / / Failure to Directly Address a Juror’s Stated Bias Required Reversal—“Bright...

Failure to Directly Address a Juror’s Stated Bias Required Reversal—“Bright Line” Rule Explained

The Third Department, over a dissent, determined that, once the prospective juror (No. 383) expressed a bias based upon the age difference between the adult defendant and child complainant, the failure to gain the assurance from the juror that her prior state of mind will not influence her verdict and she will render an impartial verdict based solely on the evidence constituted reversible error. The fact that the juror assured the judge she would not vote to convict if she had a reasonable doubt and that she would follow the law as instructed was not enough to address the expressed age-related bias.  A juror who has expressed a bias must unambiguously assure the court she will put her bias aside:

Once a prospective juror has identified his or her own biased perspective, he or she “must expressly state that his [or her] prior state of mind concerning either the case or either of the parties will not influence his [or her] verdict, and he [or she] must also state that he [or she] will render an impartial verdict based solely on the evidence” … . “[N]othing less than a personal, unequivocal assurance of impartiality can cure a juror’s prior indication that [he or] she is predisposed against a particular defendant or particular type of case” …, and, accordingly, the “bright-line standard . . . followed throughout the state” is “that a prospective juror who expresses partiality towards [one party] and cannot unequivocally promise to set aside this bias should be removed for cause” … . * * *

Considering the entirety of the questions posed to juror No. 383 and her responses, juror No. 383 unambiguously acknowledged a form of bias — based on the respective ages of the victim and defendant — that she identified as preventing her from being a fair and impartial juror. After juror No. 383 identified her own bias, she was never asked a question that referenced whether she could set aside any biases she held, generally, or whether she could set aside her specific bias regarding the respective ages of defendant and the victim. Further, in her responses to questions posed to her, juror No. 383 never specifically made reference to the age issue after she identified it as preventing her from being fair and impartial, and she never agreed, more generally, that she could set aside any bias that she held and decide the case in a fair and impartial manner based on the evidence presented. Therefore, juror No. 383 did not “unambiguously state that, despite preexisting opinions that might indicate bias, [she would] decide the case impartially and based on the evidence,” because she never made any statement regarding her preexisting opinion, let alone an unambiguous statement that she could set such opinion aside (People v Arnold, 96 NY2d at 363)[FN3]. Accordingly, County Court committed reversible error in denying defendant’s for-cause challenge to a juror who never contradicted or retracted her statement that her bias related to the respective ages of defendant and the victim prevented her from being a fair and impartial juror … . People v Warrington, 2015 NY Slip Op 06380, 3rd Dept 7-30-15

 

You might also like
THE REQUIREMENT IN THE LONG-TERM SOLITARY CONFINEMENT ACT (HALT ACT) THAT A HEARING BE HELD WITHIN FIVE DAYS OF PLACING AN INMATE IN A SEGREGATED HOUSING UNIT (SHU) IS “DIRECTORY,” NOT MANDATORY; THEREFORE ANY ISSUE RELATED TO A DELAY IN HOLDING THE HEARING MUST BE PRESERVED FOR REVIEW AND THE INMATE MUST DEMONSTRATE PREJUDICE CAUSED BY THE DELAY (THIRD DEPT).
DEFENSE COUNSEL TOOK A POSITION ADVERSE TO HER CLIENT’S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA, SENTENCE VACATED AND MATTER REMITTED FOR ASSIGNMENT OF A NEW ATTORNEY FOR THE MOTION (THIRD DEPT).
Pat-Down Search After Stop for Traffic Infractions Okay
COURT DID NOT CONSIDER THE APPROPRIATE FACTORS BEFORE PROCEEDING TO TRIAL IN DEFENDANT’S ABSENCE, DEFENDANT HAD MADE ALL PRIOR APPEARANCES AND NO EFFORT WAS MADE TO SECURE HIS PRESENCE AT THE TRIAL (THIRD DEPT).
THE CARRIER’S FAILURE TO INDICATE WHEN IT OBJECTED TO THE RULING OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW JUDGE JUSTIFIED THE DENIAL OF THE CARRIER’S APPLICATION FOR REVIEW (THIRD DEPT).
ALTHOUGH THERE WAS PROOF DEFENDANT WAS AWARE THE CO-DEFENDANT POSSESSED A WEAPON, THERE WAS NO PROOF DEFENDANT ACTED AS AN ACCOMPLICE IN THE CO-DEFENDANT’S POSSESSION OF A WEAPON; DEFENDANT’S CONVICTION OF CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A WEAPON UNDER AN ACCOMPLICE THEORY WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (THIRD DEPT).
Charitable Trust’s Challenge to Tax Foreclosure Time-Barred—Four-Month Statute of Limitations Applies to Action for Declaratory Judgment—RPTL, not the EPTL, Controls
Jury Should Not Have Been Allowed to Hear Defendant’s Refusal to Waive His Right to Remain Silent and His Invocation of His Right to Counsel

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

“No Damages for Delay” and “Mandatory Notice” Clauses... Petitioner-Teacher Never Consented to an “Out of Area” Assignment—Therefore...