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Criteria for Common Law or Implied Indemnification Explained

In affirming Supreme Court’s denial of summary judgment to the defendants in a construction-accident case, the Third Department clearly explained the criteria for common law or implied indemnification.  In a nutshell, any negligence by the party seeking indemnification for payments made to the injured party on behalf of a negligent tortfeasor will preclude recovery. Common law or implied indemnification applies only to parties who are liable vicariously without fault:

“The principle of common-law, or implied indemnification, permits one who has been compelled to pay for the wrong of another to recover from the wrongdoer the damages it paid to the injured party. Since the predicate of common-law indemnity is vicarious liability without actual fault on the part of the proposed indemnitee, it follows that a party who has itself actually participated to some degree in the wrongdoing cannot receive the benefit of the doctrine” … . Accordingly, in order “[t]o establish a claim for common-law indemnification, the party seeking indemnity must prove not only that it was not guilty of any negligence beyond the statutory liability, but must also prove that the proposed indemnitor was guilty of some negligence that contributed to the cause of the accident” … . Hackert v Emmanuel Cong. United Church of Christ, 2015 NY Slip Op 06192, 3rd Dept 7-16-15

 

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