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Failure to Make Clear in the Jury Instructions that the Acquittal on the Top Count Based Upon the Justification Defense Required Acquittal on the Lesser Counts As Well Rendered the Verdict “Ambiguous”—New Trial Ordered in the Interest of Justice

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Tom, exercising the court’s “interest of justice” jurisdiction, determined defendant was entitled to a new trial because the jury instructions did not make clear that, if the jury found the defendant’s actions justified (self-defense), acquittal on all counts was mandatory. The defendant was charged with attempted murder, attempted assault in the first degree, and assault second degree stemming from a stabbing. There was evidence defendant may have acted in self-defense.  Therefore the jury was given the justification-defense instruction. The jury found the defendant not guilty of attempted murder, but guilty of the lesser two counts. If the not guilty verdict was based on the justification defense, then the defendant should have been acquitted of all charges. The jury instructions did not make the effect of finding the defendant’s acts justified clear. Because it could not be discerned whether the jury acquitted the defendant of attempted murder based on the justification defense, the verdict was ambiguous and a new trial was required, notwithstanding that the error in the jury instructions was not preserved:

On this record, review of the issue in the interest of justice is warranted because it is impossible to discern whether acquittal of the top count of attempted murder in the second degree was based on the jurors’ finding of justification so as to mandate acquittal on the two lesser counts. While lack of justification was included as an element of each crime, the verdict sheet and the court’s accompanying explanation created confusion, because they indicated among other things that the jurors “must consider” count three irrespective of their disposition of higher counts and they failed to explicitly convey that a finding of justification on the top count precluded further deliberation. While the trial court did follow the CJI justification instruction in its charge, it also included as an element of each offense “[t]hat the defendant was not justified,” which may have led the jurors to conclude that deliberation on each crime required reconsideration of the justification defense, even if they had already acquitted the defendant of the top count of attempted murder in the second degree based on justification. People v Velez, 2015 NY Slip Op 05619, 1st Dept 6-30-15

 

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