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Conflicting Interests Prevented Attorney from Representing Both the Driver and Passenger in a Stopped Car Which Was Rear-Ended

The Second Department determined, once a counterclaim was made against the driver of the car which was stopped and rear-ended, a conflict of interest arose prohibiting an attorney from representing both the driver and the passenger (Earl):

The general rule is that an attorney is not entitled to a fee in a personal injury action if the attorney violated the Rules of Professional Conduct (12 NYCRR 1200.0) by representing both the driver of an automobile involved in a collision and a passenger in that vehicle … provides, in pertinent part, with respect to conflicts of interests involving current clients, that a lawyer shall not represent a client if a reasonable lawyer would conclude that “the representation will involve the lawyer in representing differing interests” (Rules of Professional Conduct [22 NYCRR 1200.0] rule 1.7[a][1]) . Pursuant to rule 1.7(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct (22 NYCRR 1200.0) the potential conflict may be waived if the lawyer reasonably believes that he or she will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client, the representation is not prohibited by law, the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against the other in the same litigation, and each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. In the instant case, there was no written confirmation of informed consent to the potential conflict.

[The attorney] contends that since Earl was a passenger in a stopped vehicle which was struck in the rear, the driver of the stopped vehicle was clearly not at fault, and there was no conflict of interest … . However, once the defendant asserted a counterclaim, the pecuniary interests of the driver conflicted with those of the passenger… . Shelby v Blakes, 2015 NY Slip Op 04839, 2nd Dept 6-10-15

 

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