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POLICE DISCIPLINE PROPERLY CONTROLLED BY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, DESPITE STATUTORY PROVISION PLACING DISCIPLINE IN THE HANDS OF THE COMMISSIONER.

The Third Department determined that a provision of the Second Class Cities Law specifically allowed the statute to be superseded by subsequent statutes. The Second Class City Law placed police discipline in the hands of the commissioner.  However a subsequently enacted provision of the Civil Services Law (called the Taylor Law) required police discipline to be the subject of a collective bargaining agreement, absent conflicting legislation. The Taylor Law prevailed because of the “planned obsolescence” of the Second Class City Law statute:

 

… [T]he Taylor Law mandates that disciplinary procedures for all public employees be the subject of good faith collective bargaining … . “[Courts] have long recognized the ‘strong and sweeping policy of the State to support collective bargaining under the Taylor Law'” … . Indeed, “the presumption is that all terms and conditions of employment are subject to mandatory bargaining” … . However, because of the “competing policy . . . favoring strong disciplinary authority for those in charge of police forces[, w]here legislation specifically commits police discipline to the discretion of local officials,” the policy favoring collective bargaining will give way to the legislatively established disciplinary procedures … . * * *

… [T]he clear and unambiguous language of Second Class Cities Law § 4 provides the best evidence that the Legislature intended to allow any or all of the provisions of the Second Class Cities Law to be supplanted by later laws applicable to the same subject matter … . Accordingly, we conclude that Second Class Cities Law article 9 does not require “that the policy favoring collective bargaining should give way” … . Matter of City of Schenectady v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 2016 NY Slip Op 00729, 3rd Dept 2-4-16

 

MUNICIPAL LAW (POLICE DISCIPLINE CONTROLLED BY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, NOT CONFLICTING STATUTE)/UNIONS (POLICE DISCIPLINE CONTROLLED BY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, NOT CONFLICTING STATUTE)/STATUTES (PLANNED OBSOLESCENCE OF STATUTE ALLOWED IT TO BE SUPERSEDED BY SUBSEQUENT STATUTE)

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