You are here: / / Elements of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and Prima Facie...
,

Elements of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and Prima Facie Tort Described

In finding the counterclaims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and prima facie tort were properly dismissed, the Third Department described the elements of those causes of action:

…[W]ith respect to the counterclaim for intentional infliction of emotional distress [,] … [defendant] was required to plead “extreme and outrageous conduct, the intentional or reckless nature of such conduct, a causal relationship between the conduct and the resulting injury, and severe emotional distress” … . Notably, the alleged conduct must be “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency . . . and [be] utterly intolerable in a civilized community” … . Here, [defendant] alleged that, during the course of their professional relationship, plaintiff sent unwanted gifts and letters, engaged in suggestive conversations and made threats of future conduct toward him. Even reading the allegations liberally and accepting them as true, we find that the alleged conduct, while undeniably inappropriate, did not rise to the level of being “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency” … . …

As for [defendant’s] counterclaim for prima facie tort, there can be no recovery under this theory “unless malevolence is the sole motive for [plaintiff’s] otherwise lawful act or, in [other words], unless [plaintiff] acts from disinterested malevolence” … . Stated another way, the act “must be a malicious one unmixed with any other and exclusively directed to injury and damage of another” … . Hyman v Schwartz, 2015 NY Slip Op 02819, 3rd Dept 4-2-15

 

You might also like
COURT IMPROPERLY REQUIRED DEFENDANT TO WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO APPEAL, DEFENDANT’S PLEA WAS NOT SUBJECT TO A PLEA BARGAIN.
DEFENDANT’S PLEA COLLOQUY NEGATED AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT (JURAT) OF HIS PERJURY CONVICTIONS; PLEA VACATED (THIRD DEPT).
THERE ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE ROAD LEADING TO PETITIONER’S PROPERTY WAS PROPERLY CERTIFIED “ABANDONED” SUCH THAT THE MUNICIPALITY IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR ITS MAINTENANCE; AND PETITIONER STATED AN EQUAL-PROTECTION CLAIM UNDER 42 USC 1983 (THIRD DEPT).
COUNTY COURT DID NOT CORRECTLY APPLY THE CRITERIA OF THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SURVIVORS JUSTICE ACT (DVSJA) WHEN CONSIDERING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR RESENTENCING; THE THIRD DEPARTMENT DETERMINED DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO A MORE LENIENT SENTENCE UNDER THE ACT AND RESENTENCED HER TO TIME SERVED (THIRD DEPT).
MOTION TO VACATE A CONVICTION CAN BE BASED UPON A SHOWING OF ACTUAL INNOCENCE, NOT SHOWN HERE (THIRD DEPT).
BLOGGER FOR THE NATION MAGAZINE NOT AN EMPLOYEE.
Records of a Police Investigation of a Police Officer Who Has Been Terminated Are Not “Personnel Records” Subject to Exemption from Disclosure Pursuant to the “Personnel Records” Provision of the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL)
DEFENDANT WAS CHARGED WITH PREDATORY SEXUAL ASSAULT AGAINST A CHILD, A CLASS A-II FELONY PUNISHABLE BY A MANDATORY MAXIMUM TERM OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT; PURSUANT TO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW 195.10[1][B] DEFENDANT CANNOT WAIVE INDICTMENT AND PLEAD TO A SUPERIOR COURT INFORMATION (SCI) (THIRD DEPT). ​

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Child No Longer Had Sufficient Connection to New York State—Custody-Enforcement... A Stipulation Cannot Bind an Insurer to Nonexistent Coverage