You are here: / / Emergency Doctrine Precluded Action on Behalf of Driver of Car Which Crossed...
,

Emergency Doctrine Precluded Action on Behalf of Driver of Car Which Crossed Into On-Coming Lane of Traffic; ”Noseworthy” Doctrine Did Not Apply to Reduce Plaintiff’s Decedent’s Burden of Proof

The Fourth Department reversed Supreme Court and granted summary judgment to defendant who was struck when plaintiff’s decedent’s on-coming car crossed into defendant’s lane.  The court determined the “Noseworthy” rule (lowering the plaintiff’s burden of proof) did not apply and the emergency doctrine precluded recovery:

Under the emergency doctrine, “ ‘when [a driver] is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration, or causes [the driver] to be reasonably so disturbed that [he or she] must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the [driver] may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context, provided the [driver] has not created the emergency’ ” … .  It is well established that a driver is “not required to anticipate that [a] vehicle, traveling in the opposite direction, [will] cross over into his [or her] lane of travel” … .

Here, defendants met their initial burden by establishing that the emergency doctrine applied, inasmuch as they established that decedent’s vehicle unexpectedly crossed over into defendant’s lane of travel, defendant had been operating his vehicle in a lawful and prudent manner, and defendant had little time to react to avoid the collision … .  Although “it generally remains a question for the trier of fact to determine whether an emergency existed and, if so, whether the [driver’s] response was reasonable” …, we conclude that summary judgment is appropriate here because defendants presented “sufficient evidence to establish the reasonableness of [defendant’s] actions [in an emergency situation] and there is no opposing evidentiary showing sufficient to raise a legitimate question of fact”… . Shanahan… v Mackowiak…, 1105, 4th Dept 11-8-13

 

You might also like
PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE CONTINUITY OF OWNERSHIP ELEMENT OF THE DE FACTO MERGER DOCTRINE SUCH THAT THE ASSETS OF ONE DEFENDANT SHOULD BE USED TO SATISFY THE DEBT OF ANOTHER (FOURTH DEPT).
Summary Judgment Properly Granted in Favor of Defendant Who Had the Right of Way When Plaintiff Pulled Into Defendant’s Path from a Stop, Even Though there Was Evidence Defendant Was Travelling Slightly Over the Speed Limit/No Evidence Accident Would Have Been Avoided Had the Defendant Been Traveling at the Speed Limit
THE UNAMBIGUOUS INSURANCE POLICY DID NOT INCLUDE COVERAGE FOR LOSS OF BUSINESS INCOME AND THE POLICY MUST BE ENFORCED AS WRITTEN (FOURTH DEPT).
SUPPORT MAGISTRATE SHOULD NOT HAVE ALLOWED FATHER’S ATTORNEY TO WITHDRAW WITHOUT NOTICE TO FATHER AND SHOULD NOT HAVE PROCEEDED IN FATHER’S ABSENCE (FOURTH DEPT).
Determination Whether Defendant Is a Youthful Offender Is Mandatory for Every Eligible Youth
Seizure of Claimant’s Computers Pursuant to a Warrant Did Not Give Rise to Conversion, Negligent Misrepresentation and Constitutional Tort Causes of Action—Elements of Those Causes of Action Explained
Criteria for Negligent Misrepresentation Action
ORDER OF PROTECTION ISSUED IN THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDING PROHIBITING CONTACT BETWEEN FATHER AND DAUGHTER SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO ANY SUBSEQUENT CUSTODY OR VISITATION ORDERS BY FAMILY OR SUPREME COURT (FOURTH DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Purchase of Life Estate Considered Transfer of Property Requiring Delay of Medicaid... “Sudden Stopping” and “Emergency Doctrine” Jury Instructions Proper...