You are here: / / Out-of-Possession Landlord Not Liable—Criteria Described
,

Out-of-Possession Landlord Not Liable—Criteria Described

The Second Department determined summary judgment should have been granted to the out-of-possession landlords and explained the applicable law. Plaintiff’s leg went through the roof of landlords’ building:

“An out-of-possession landlord can be held liable for injuries that occur on its premises only if the landlord has retained control over the premises and if the landlord is contractually or statutorily obligated to repair or maintain the premises or has assumed a duty to repair or maintain the premises by virtue of a course of conduct” … . Here, the building defendants established, prima facie, that I Bldg and Surfside were out-of-possession landlords with no contractual obligation by submitting the lease, which obligated the tenant to maintain the premises and make all structural and nonstructural repairs … . Although I Bldg and Surfside retained a right to enter the premises, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the allegedly dangerous condition on the premises violated an applicable statutory provision sufficient to impose liability upon them … . The plaintiff did not contend that the building defendants assumed a duty to repair the premises by virtue of a course of conduct. Martin v I Bldg Co., Inc., 2015 NY Slip Op 02100, 2nd Dept 3-18-15

 

You might also like
Adverse Interest Exception to In Pari Delicto Defense May Apply—The Two Concepts Are Briefly Explained
THE SECOND DEPARTMENT JOINED THE FIRST AND THIRD DEPARTMENTS IN HOLDING THAT THE EXTENDED STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN THE CHILD VICTIMS ACT APPLIES TO A NEW YORK RESIDENT WHO WAS ABUSED OUT-OF-STATE (SECOND DEPT).
IF THE 2008 FORECLOSURE ACTION COMMENCED BY AEGIS WAS VALID, THE INSTANT FORECLOSURE ACTION BY A DIFFERENT BANK WOULD BE TIME-BARRED; PLAINTIFF BANK RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT BY SUBMITTING EVIDENCE THAT AEGIS DID NOT POSSESS THE NOTE AND MORTGAGE AT THE TIME THE 2008 ACTION WAS COMMENCED AND THEREFORE DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO FORECLOSE (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF IN THIS DIVORCE ACTION WAS ENTITLED TO A NEW HEARING ON WHETHER THE PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT SHOULD BE SET ASIDE; THE COURT NOTED THAT A CONTRACT WHICH MAY NOT BE UNCONSCIONABLE WHEN ENTERED MAY BECOME UNCONSCIONABLE WHEN FINAL JUDGMENT IS ENTERED (SECOND DEPT).
THE CONFLICTING EXPERT REPORTS AND OTHER EVIDENCE RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CAUSED SERIOUS INJURY DESPITE PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT’S PREEXISTING CONDITIONS (FIRST DEPT).
Bank’s Duty With Respect to Negligent Dishonoring of a Cashier’s Check 
THE SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED; SUCCESSIVE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS ARE GENERALLY PROHIBITED (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF’S INABILITY TO IDENTIFY THE WET SUBSTANCE ON THE STEP WHERE SHE ALLEGEDLY FELL WAS NOT AN INABILITY TO IDENTIFY THE CAUSE OF THE FALL (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

The Jury Should Have Been Instructed on the Res Ipsa Loquitur Doctrine—Infection... Failure to Link Specific Monetary Loss to Acts or Omissions of the Attorneys...