You are here: / / Prior Written Notice Requirement Does Not Apply When It Is Alleged the...
,

Prior Written Notice Requirement Does Not Apply When It Is Alleged the Municipality Created the Dangerous Condition

The Second Department noted that the “written notice of a dangerous condition” pre-requisite for municipal liability does not apply when it is alleged the municipality created the dangerous condition:

A municipality that has enacted or is subject to a prior written notice statute, such as Village Law § 6-628 or CPLR 9804, may not be subjected to liability for injuries caused by a defective or dangerous condition that comes within the ambit of those laws, such as an alleged defective boardwalk …, unless it has received written notice of the defect, or an exception to the written notice requirement applies … . The only two recognized exceptions to the prior written notice requirement are where the municipality created the defect through an affirmative act of negligence, or where the defect resulted from a special use of the property by the municipality which conferred a special benefit on it … . Moreover, “the affirmative negligence exception is limited to work by the [municipality] that immediately results in the existence of a dangerous condition'” … .

Where, as here, the plaintiff expressly asserted in the complaint or a bill of particulars that the municipality created the defective condition by an affirmative act of negligence, the municipality, in order to make a prima facie showing in support of a motion for summary judgment, must demonstrate that it did not create the condition … . Joyce v Village of Saltaire, 2015 NY Slip Op 01925, 2nd Dept 3-11-15

 

You might also like
PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE STANDING TO BRING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION (SECOND DEPT).
DEFENDANT OFFERED MORE TO SETTLE THE ACTION THAN WAS AWARDED PLAINTIFF AFTER TRIAL; DEFENDANT WAS THEREFORE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES PURSUANT TO CPLR 3220 (SECOND DEPT).
Question of Fact Re: Whether the “Continuous Representation Doctrine” Tolled the Three-Year Statute of Limitations in a Legal Malpractice Action
DEFENDANTS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE ACTUAL NOTICE OF THE SUMMONS WAS NOT RECEIVED IN TIME TO DEFEND THE ACTION, AND DID NOT PROVIDE A REASONABLE EXCUSE FOR THE DEFAULT; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO VACATE THE DEFAULT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
ONLY CONTRACTORS AND OWNERS AND THEIR AGENTS CAN BE LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1) AND 241(6); HERE DEFENDANT DEMONSTRATED IT WAS NOT AN AGENT FOR ANY POTENTIALLY LIABLE PARTY BECAUSE IT EXERCISED NO SUPERVISORY CONTROL OVER THE WORKSITE (SECOND DEPT).
FORMER PRESIDENT OF THE CORPORATION WHICH OWNED AN APARTMENT BUILDING HAD THE APPARENT AUTHORITY TO SELL THE BUILDING, BUYER WAS A BONA FIDE PURCHASER (SECOND DEPT).
DEFENDANT PROPERTY-OWNER HAD ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE RECURRING RAINWATER LEAKS; PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF CHURCH’S OBJECTION TO THE SYNOD’S TAKING CONTROL OF A SCHOOL OPERATED BY PLAINTIFF CHURCH IS A RELIGIOUS CONTROVERSY WHICH IS NOT JUSTICIABLE IN STATE COURTS (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Criteria for (Upward) Departure from the Risk Level Assessed by the Board of... Corporation Is a Proper Respondent in an Article 78/Mandamus to Compel Proc...