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Time Constraints, In Workers’ Compensation Law 25, for Seeking Reimbursement for Compensation Paid by Self-Insured Employer Applied to Workers’ Compensation Law 30 As Well

The Third Department determined the self-insured employer waived its right to reimbursement for compensation payments made to its employee because it failed to make a timely claim under Workers’ Compensation Law 25(4)(a).  The court concluded that the wording of Workers’ Compensation Law 30 did not require a different result.  Section 30 was interpreted to include the time constraints imposed by section 25:

Here, the Board correctly determined that the employer was required to file timely requests for reimbursement, but did not do so. Workers’ Compensation Law § 25 (4) (a) provides that “[i]f the employer has made advance payments of compensation, or has made payments to an employee in like manner as wages during any period of disability, [the employer] shall be entitled to be reimbursed out of an unpaid instalment or instalments of compensation due, provided [the employer’s] claim for reimbursement is filed before award of compensation is made.” If this statute alone is applied here, the employer is precluded from recovering the full wages paid to claimant pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207-c because the employer did not file requests for reimbursement prior to the initial awards of compensation benefits for the relevant time periods … .

The employer contends that Workers’ Compensation Law § 30 applies instead. That statute provides that “any salary or wages paid to . . . [a claimant] under and pursuant to [General Municipal Law § 207-c] shall be credited against any award of compensation . . . under this chapter” (Workers’ Compensation Law § 30 [3]). To analyze these provisions, “the text of a statute is the best evidence of legislative intent and, where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the court should construe it so as to give effect to the plain meaning of the words used” … . Because these two provisions are related statutes in the Workers’ Compensation Law, they “must be construed together unless a contrary legislative intent is expressed, and courts must harmonize the related provisions in a way that renders them compatible” … . Workers’ Compensation Law §§ 25 and 30 both provide a right to reimbursement out of future benefits, with section 30 being more specific regarding the statutory basis for the wage replacement payments sought to be reimbursed. Workers’ Compensation Law § 25 (4) (a) additionally provides that the employer will waive that right if it fails to timely submit a claim for reimbursement. “If by any fair construction, a reasonable field of operation can be found for [both of these related] statutes, that construction should be adopted” … . A reasonable construction of these two statutes is to read them together and conclude that the right of reimbursement granted by both statutes will be waived if the employer fails to submit a timely request for reimbursement. Matter of O’Brien v Albany County Sheriff’s Dept., 2015 NY Slip Op 01842, 3rd Dept 3-5-15

 

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