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Criteria for Discovery in a Special Proceeding Explained/Criteria for Leave to File a Late Notice of Claim Explained

The Second Department determined petitioner’s application for leave to file a late notice of claim was properly denied, as was petitioner’s request for discovery prior to the hearing.  The court explained the relevant analytical criteria:

In a special proceeding, where disclosure is available only by leave of the court (see CPLR 408), the Supreme Court has broad discretion in granting or denying disclosure …, although it must balance the needs of the party seeking discovery against such opposing interests as expediency and confidentiality … . Contrary to the petitioners’ contention, they failed to demonstrate that the requested discovery was necessary and that providing the requested discovery would not unduly delay this proceeding … .

In determining whether to permit service of a late notice of claim, the court must consider all relevant facts and circumstances, including whether (1) the public corporation acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days of the incident or a reasonable time thereafter, (2) the petitioner had a reasonable excuse for the delay, and (3) the public corporation was prejudiced by the delay in its ability to maintain its defense on the merits (see Education Law § 3813[2-a]; General Municipal Law § 50-e[5]…). The injured petitioner’s assertion that she did not immediately appreciate the nature and severity of her injuries during the first 90 days after the subject incident is unavailing without supporting medical evidence explaining why the possible permanent effects of the injuries took so long to become apparent and to be diagnosed … . * * *

In addition, the petitioners failed to establish that the respondent acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or within a reasonable time thereafter … . * * *

Finally, the petitioners failed to establish that the respondent would not be substantially prejudiced in its defense on the merits by the significant delay should leave be granted … . Matter of Bramble v New York City Dept of Education, 2015 NY Slip Op 01450, 2nd Dept 2-18-15

 

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