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Relatives of Persons Buried in Defendant Cemetery Could Not Sue As Beneficiaries of the Charitable Trust Set Up to Ensure Perpetual Care of the Cemetery Plots

In a full-fledged opinion by Justice Saxe, the First Department determined that the relatives of persons buried in defendant cemetery did not have standing to sue as beneficiaries of a charitable trust which was supposed to ensure perpetual care of the cemetery plots.  [However, one of the plaintiffs, who himself was a donor to the charitable trust, did have standing to sue:

EPTL article 1, which governs charitable trusts, specifically includes trusts for the perpetual care of graves: “Dispositions of property in trust for the purpose of the perpetual care … of cemeteries or private burial lots in cemeteries … shall be deemed to be for charitable and benevolent purposes” (EPTL 8-1.5). The statute directs the State Attorney General to protect and enforce the interests and rights of the beneficiaries: “The attorney general shall represent the beneficiaries of such dispositions for religious, charitable, educational or benevolent purposes and it shall be his duty to enforce the rights of such beneficiaries by appropriate proceedings in the courts” (EPTL § 8-1.1[f] [emphasis added]). “The obvious purpose of this provision was to provide a mechanism for enforcement of trusts whose beneficiaries were unascertainable” … . * * *

… [A]llowing relatives to bring lawsuits as to each lot, plot or grave could create endless litigation, substantially depleting the trust assets. Enforcement of the subject charitable trusts is therefore best left to the Attorney General, so as not to expose the trust funds to money-draining multiple lawsuits, and to avoid setting a precedent of allowing a broad, vague beneficiary base to commence multiple actions against a charitable trust. Lucker v Bayside Cemetary, 2013 NY Slip Op 08835, 1st Dept 12-31-13

 

 

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