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District Attorney’s Office Did Not Adequately Justify Its Denial of Inmate’s Requests for Color Photographs and Unredacted Documents Re: 18-Year-Old Murder Prosecution

The Second Department determined that the Records Access Officer (RAO) of a district attorney’s office did not adequately justify its failure to comply with petitioner requests for color photographs and unredacted documents related to an 18-year-old murder prosecution against him.  The Second Department explained the relevant law in some depth:

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to compel the production of material pursuant to FOIL, the agency denying access has the burden of demonstrating that the material requested falls within a statutory exemption, which exemptions are to be narrowly construed (see Public Officers Law § 89[5][e], [f]… . This showing requires the entity resisting disclosure to “articulate a particularized and specific justification for denying access'” … . “Conclusory assertions that certain records fall within a statutory exemption are not sufficient; evidentiary support is needed” … . Because FOIL is “based on a presumption of access to the records” …, “FOIL compels disclosure, not concealment'” wherever the agency fails to demonstrate that a statutory exemption applies … .

In this case, in response to the petitioner’s FOIL requests, the respondent provided the petitioner with certain documents that contained numerous redactions, and denied the petitioner’s request for photographs of the deceased victim. The respondent based the redactions and the denial of the request for the photographs upon the “unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” statutory exemption (Public Officers Law § 87[2][b]). However, since the respondent failed to proffer more than conclusory assertions to support these claims, the Supreme Court erred in determining that the respondent met his burden of demonstrating that the redactions and denial of the request for the photographs of the deceased victim fell within this statutory exemption (see Public Officers Law § 89[5][e], [f];…).

The Supreme Court also erred in determining that the petitioner was not entitled to receive color copies of certain photographs that were disclosed to him. Public Officers Law § 86(4) provides that photographs are records within the meaning of the statute, and section 87(1)(b) of the statute requires an agency to provide copies or reproductions of records. Pursuant to Public Officer Law § 87(1)(c)(ii), an agency may engage an outside professional service to prepare a copy of a record if its information technology equipment is inadequate to prepare a copy. Applying these principles, we find that since the respondent did not claim he was unable to comply with the petitioner’s request, FOIL requires him to provide the petitioner with color copies of all disclosable photographs in his possession. Matter of Baez v Brown, 2015 NY Slip Op 00754, 2nd Dept 1-28-15

 

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