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Failure to Provide Pre-Restraint Notice to a Judgment Debtor as Required by the Exempt Income Protection Act Violates Due Process

In a full-fledged opinion by Justice Hall, the Second Department determined that the failure of the judgment debtor’s bank to provide the notice required by the Exempt Income Protection Act (CPLR 5222-a) before restraining the debtor’s account violated due process:

…[T]he statutory mechanism requires the attorney for the judgment creditor to serve a judgment debtor’s banking institution with a copy of the restraining notice, an exemption notice, and two exemption claim forms (see CPLR 5222-a[b][1]). The statute then requires the banking institution, within two business days after receipt of such documents, to serve upon the judgment debtor a copy of the restraining notice, the exemption notice, and the two exemption claim forms (see CPLR 5222-a[b][3]). In this action, the attorney for the judgment creditor properly sent the required documents to the judgment debtor’s bank, but the bank did not timely send the documents to the judgment debtor. As a result, the judgment debtor’s bank account was restrained without any notice to her or any opportunity to claim that certain funds in the account were exempt from debt collection. We conclude that this constituted a violation of the judgment debtor’s due process rights, and, as a remedy, afford the judgment debtor the opportunity to claim exemptions before any funds in her account are turned over. Distressed Holdings LLC v Ehrler, 2013 NY Slip Op 08044, 2nd Dept 12-4-13

 

 

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