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QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE FIRE DAMAGED PROPERTY WAS PLAINTIFF’S RESIDENCE REQUIRED DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS DISCLAIMER ACTION (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in this action against a homeowner’s insurance company for disclaiming coverage was properly denied. Coverage for fire damage was disclaimed based upon the allegation the property was not plaintiff’s residence. Apparently plaintiff lived elsewhere, at least part of the time, while the house was being extensively renovated:

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Plaintiff testified that she slept at the premises on several occasions, an average of two to four nights per week, and that she intended for the premises to be her permanent residence once renovations were completed. During his deposition, Larrea [the insurer’s claim investigator] testified that he obtained a statement from plaintiff shortly after the fire in which she stated that she was not living at the premises. In opposition to the motion, defendant submitted an affidavit from Larrea, who averred that when he interviewed plaintiff by telephone eight days after the fire, she stated that at the time of the fire that she was in the process of relocating from her father’s home to the apartment and, notably, that she had not been to the premises during the two weeks immediately preceding the fire and had stayed overnight at the premises only once.

On this record, plaintiff’s summary judgment motion was properly denied. The Court of Appeals has held that evidence similar to the record in this case presented issues of fact regarding residency that precluded the grant of summary judgment … . Moreover, as Supreme Court correctly held, the contradictory statements that plaintiff made regarding the extent of her own physical presence at the premises are alone sufficient to create an issue of fact that may not be resolved by summary judgment. Sosenko v Allstate Ins. Co., 2017 NY Slip Op 08425, Third Dept 11-30-17

 

INSURANCE LAW (QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE FIRE DAMAGED PROPERTY WAS PLAINTIFF’S RESIDENCE REQUIRED DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS DISCLAIMER ACTION (THIRD DEPT))/RESIDENCE (INSURANCE LAW, QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE FIRE DAMAGED PROPERTY WAS PLAINTIFF’S RESIDENCE REQUIRED DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS DISCLAIMER ACTION (THIRD DEPT))/DISCLAIMER (INSURANCE LAW, RESIDENCE, QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE FIRE DAMAGED PROPERTY WAS PLAINTIFF’S RESIDENCE REQUIRED DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS DISCLAIMER ACTION (THIRD DEPT))

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