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DENIAL OF PAROLEE’S REQUEST TO LIVE IN HIS FAMILY HOME WAS APPARENTLY BASED UPON COMMUNITY PRESSURE AND WAS REVERSED AS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it denied petitioner permission to live in his family home (Telford home) after released on parole, apparently based upon community pressure:

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“Pursuant to Executive Law § 259-c(2) and 9 NYCRR 8003.3, special conditions may be imposed upon a parolee’s right to release. The courts routinely uphold these conditions as long as they are rationally related to the inmate’s past conduct and future chance of recidivism. Acceptable parole restrictions have included geographical restrictions and restrictions requiring that parolees refrain from contact with certain individuals or classes of individuals”… .

Under the circumstances of this case, speculation by DOCCS about possible community efforts to exclude the petitioner from otherwise suitable housing and about the petitioner’s potential response to such efforts is not a rational basis for denial of otherwise suitable housing … . As the respondents have articulated no other basis for denying approval of the proposed residence, the respondents’ refusal to approve the Telford home as a suitable postrelease residence was arbitrary and capricious, as the determination bears no rational relation to the petitioner’s past conduct or likelihood that he will re-offend … . Matter of Telford v McCartney, 2017 NY Slip Op 08384,  Second Dept 11-29-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (DENIAL OF PAROLEE’S REQUEST TO LIVE IN HIS FAMILY HOME WAS APPARENTLY BASED UPON COMMUNITY PRESSURE AND WAS REVERSED AS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS (SECOND DEPT))/PAROLE (DENIAL OF PAROLEE’S REQUEST TO LIVE IN HIS FAMILY HOME WAS APPARENTLY BASED UPON COMMUNITY PRESSURE AND WAS REVERSED AS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS (SECOND DEPT))

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