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You are here: Home1 / Civil Procedure2 / CPLR 311-A REQUIREMENTS FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS ON A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY...
Civil Procedure, Limited Liability Company Law

CPLR 311-A REQUIREMENTS FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS ON A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY NOT MET, COURT DID NOT OBTAIN JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the plaintiff did not comply with the CPLR requirements for service of a summons and complaint upon a limited liability company and the court did not obtain jurisdiction over the defendant:

Here, the plaintiff commenced the action by the filing of a summons and verified complaint on September 20, 2016. The affirmation of personal service executed by the plaintiff’s counsel stated that on September 24, 2016, at the defendant’s store located in Hicksville, he personally served the defendant with a copy of the summons and complaint by delivering it to “JANE DOE, A PERSON WHO REFUSED TO PROVIDE NAME.” Although this attempt at service occurred within 120 days after the commencement of the action, the defendant correctly contends that the manner of service failed to comply with the requirements of CPLR 311-a, which provides, as relevant here, that personal service upon a limited liability company shall be made by delivering a copy personally to any member or manager of the company, any agent authorized to receive process, or any other person designated by the company to receive process. The defendant, by its evidentiary submissions, demonstrated that the individual purportedly served was not authorized to receive process on behalf of the defendant, and thus, jurisdiction over the defendant was not obtained … . Pinzon v IKEA N.Y., LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 05213, Second Dept 7-11-18

CIVIL PROCEDURE (CPLR 311-A REQUIREMENTS FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS ON A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY NOT MET, COURT DID NOT OBTAIN JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANT (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 311-A (CPLR 311-A REQUIREMENTS FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS ON A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY NOT MET, COURT DID NOT OBTAIN JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANT (SECOND DEPT))/LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY (CPLR 311-A REQUIREMENTS FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS ON A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY NOT MET, COURT DID NOT OBTAIN JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANT (SECOND DEPT))/JURISDICTION  (CPLR 311-A REQUIREMENTS FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS ON A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY NOT MET, COURT DID NOT OBTAIN JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANT (SECOND DEPT))

July 11, 2018
Tags: Second Department
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