You are here: / / TENANT DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO SUE LANDLORD’S INSURER FOR DENIAL...
, ,

TENANT DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO SUE LANDLORD’S INSURER FOR DENIAL OF A PROPERTY DAMAGE CLAIM, TENANT HAD NOT PROCURED A JUDGMENT AGAINST THE LANDLORD, A PREREQUISITE FOR A DIRECT SUIT AGAINST THE INSURER (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined plaintiff lessee’s lawsuit against the lessor’s insurance carrier for denial of a claim for water damage was properly dismissed. Under New York law plaintiff could not sue the landlord’s carrier directly unless plaintiff first procured a judgment against the landlord which was not satisfied:

​

… [I]t was well-established under the common law that an injured party has no direct cause of action against the insurer of a tortfeasor … . That is, an injured party, as a stranger to the policy between the insured tortfeasor and its insurer, could not, at common law, bring a claim against the tortfeasor’s insurer due to the lack of privity between the injured party and the insurer, even where the injured party had obtained a judgment against the insured … . As a result of the hardships and inequities this rule created, the Legislature created a “limited statutory cause of action on behalf of injured parties directly against insurers,” which is applicable where the injured party has obtained a judgment against an insured and the judgment has gone unsatisfied for 30 days … . It is undisputed that plaintiff has not obtained a judgment against [the landlord], which is “a condition precedent to a direct action” against [the landlord’s] insurer and, thus, plaintiff cannot avail itself of this limited statutory cause of action … . Thus, even liberally construing the complaint, accepting the facts as alleged as true and affording plaintiff the benefit of every inference, plaintiff has not stated a statutory cause of action against [the insurer]. … . As plaintiff is not a named insured under the policy and did not obtain a judgment against [the landlord], Supreme Court properly granted Cincinnati’s motion dismissing the complaint due to plaintiff’s lack of standing and failure to state a cause of action … . GM Broadcasting, Inc. v Cornelius Enters., LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 08593, Third Dept 12-7-17

 

INSURANCE LAW (LANDLORD-TENANT, CONTRACT LAW, TENANT DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO SUE LANDLORD’S INSURER FOR DENIAL OF A PROPERTY DAMAGE CLAIM, TENANT HAD NOT PROCURED A JUDGMENT AGAINST THE LANDLORD, A PREREQUISITE FOR A DIRECT SUIT AGAINST THE INSURER (THIRD DEPT))/LANDLORD-TENANT (INSURANCE LAW, CONTRACT LAW,  TENANT DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO SUE LANDLORD’S INSURER FOR DENIAL OF A PROPERTY DAMAGE CLAIM, TENANT HAD NOT PROCURED A JUDGMENT AGAINST THE LANDLORD, A PREREQUISITE FOR A DIRECT SUIT AGAINST THE INSURER (THIRD DEPT))/CONTRACT LAW (INSURANCE LAW, LANDLORD-TENANT, TENANT DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO SUE LANDLORD’S INSURER FOR DENIAL OF A PROPERTY DAMAGE CLAIM, TENANT HAD NOT PROCURED A JUDGMENT AGAINST THE LANDLORD, A PREREQUISITE FOR A DIRECT SUIT AGAINST THE INSURER (THIRD DEPT))

You might also like
PLAINTIFF-PASSENGER DID NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT DEFENDANT-DRIVER’S NEGLIGENCE; DEFENDANT-DRIVER WAS STRUCK FROM BEHIND WHEN HE STOPPED QUICKLY AFTER AN SUV MERGED INTO DEFENDANT’S LANE (THIRD DEPT).
Supreme Court’s Annulment of Regulation Permitting Out-Of-Competition Drug Testing of Harness Racehorses Reversed
DEFENDANTS ARE REQUIRED TO PRODUCE TAX AND WAGE DOCUMENTS AND TO PROVIDE FACTUAL BASES FOR THEIR REFUSAL TO ANSWER QUESTIONS, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED DEFENDANTS’ BLANKET ASSERTIONS OF THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION AND SPOUSAL PRIVILEGE IN THIS CONTEMPT PROCEEDING STEMMING FROM AN ACTION TO RECOVER A DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT (THIRD DEPT).
STATEMENTS POSTED ON AN ELECTION-RELATED FACEBOOK PAGE ABOUT THE OPPOSING CANDIDATE ARE NOT SHIELDED BY IMMUNITY AND ARE ACTIONABLE IN THIS DEFAMATION CASE; TO APPEAL THE DENIAL OF A MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF A COMPLAINT A MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL MUST BE MADE (THIRD DEPT).
QUESTION OF FACT RE DEFENDANT’S COMPARATIVE FAULT IN THIS INTERSECTION COLLISION CASE, DESPITE PLAINTIFF’S PLEADING GUILTY TO FAILURE TO YIELD THE RIGHT OF WAY 3RD DEPT.
FAILURE TO INFORM CARRIER OF LAWN CARE WORK WARRANTED RETURN OF BENEFITS PAID, BUT NOT A PERMANENT BAR ON FUTURE BENEFITS.
IN THIS CPLR ARTICLE 4 PROCEEDING BROUGHT BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE RESPONDENT NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORPORATION VIOLATED ITS FIDUCIARY DUTY AND THE NOT-FOR-PROFIT-CORPORATION LAW WITH RESPECT TO ITS AFFILIATE NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORPORATIONS AND WHETHER THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE APPLIED (THIRD DEPT).
BURGLARY AS A SEXUALLY MOTIVATED FELONY IS NOT AN ENUMERATED OFFENSE UNDER SORA, THEREFORE DEFENDANT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO REGISTER AS A SEX OFFENDER; THE WAIVER OF APPEAL WAS INVALID (THIRD DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

PAROLE PROPERLY RESCINDED BASED UPON PETITIONER’S BEHAVIOR AT THE RESCISSION... FIREFIGHTER’S GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 205-a CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE...