You are here: / / ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT VIOLATED THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW BY TURNING LEFT...

ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT VIOLATED THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW BY TURNING LEFT INTO PLAINTIFF’S PATH, DEFENDANT RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS SPEEDING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in this traffic accident case was properly denied. Plaintiff made out a prima facie case by demonstrating defendant, Gavitt, made a left turn across the plaintiff’s path and plaintiff entered an intersection. However Gavitt raised a question of fact by alleging plaintiff was speeding:

Here, the plaintiff demonstrated, prima facie, that Gavitt was negligent in violating Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1141 “by making a left turn into the path of oncoming traffic without yielding the right of way to the plaintiff when the turn could not be made with reasonable safety”… . The undisputed fact that Gavitt was, in fact, unable to complete his left turn ” without being struck by [the plaintiff’s] vehicle'” … demonstrates that he violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1141 by failing to “yield the right of way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction which [was] . . . so close as to constitute an immediate hazard” … . “Regardless of which vehicle entered the intersection first, [the plaintiff], as the driver with the right-of-way, was entitled to anticipate that [Gavitt] would obey traffic laws which required [him] to yield”… .

The plaintiff also demonstrated, prima facie, that Gavitt’s negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident, and that the plaintiff was not comparatively at fault in the happening of the accident. In this regard, the plaintiff testified at his deposition that he was traveling at 25 miles per hour immediately prior to the accident and, upon seeing Gavitt commence making the left turn in front of him, he immediately applied his brakes in an attempt to avoid colliding with Gavitt’s vehicle, but he was unable to avoid the collision … .

In opposition to the plaintiff’s prima facie showing, however, the defendants raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff was traveling at an excessive rate of speed immediately prior to the accident and whether he could have avoided the accident through the exercise of reasonable care … . Shashaty v Gavitt, 2018 NY Slip Op 01347, Second Dept 2-28-18

NEGLIGENCE (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT VIOLATED THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW BY TURNING LEFT INTO PLAINTIFF’S PATH, DEFENDANT RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS SPEEDING (SECOND DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT VIOLATED THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW BY TURNING LEFT INTO PLAINTIFF’S PATH, DEFENDANT RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS SPEEDING (SECOND DEPT))/VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW (ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT VIOLATED THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW BY TURNING LEFT INTO PLAINTIFF’S PATH, DEFENDANT RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS SPEEDING (SECOND DEPT))

You might also like
BUS COMPANY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THE BUS DRIVER SIGNALED TO DEFENDANT DRIVER TO PASS THE BUS AND THE DRIVER EITHER STRUCK THE WHEEL CHAIR LIFT OR THE PLAINTIFF WHO WAS STANDING ON THE LIFT (SECOND DEPT).
MOTION TO RENEW BASED UPON LAW OFFICE FAILURE PROPERLY GRANTED; CRITERIA FOR GRANTING A MOTION TO RENEW IS FLEXIBLE.
TAKING A LEAVE OF ABSENCE FROM A POSITION ON THE COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS TO RUN FOR STATE SENATE IS NOT THE EQUIVALENT OF RESIGNING FROM THE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, WHICH IS REQUIRED BY THE ELECTION LAW; THE DESIGNATING PETITION SHOULD HAVE BEEN INVALIDATED (SECOND DEPT). ​
THE SHORTER LIMITATIONS PERIOD IN THE FIRE INSURANCE POLICY WAS NOT FAIR AND REASONABLE; THE MOTION TO DISMISS IN THIS BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
THE FACT THAT THE SCHOOL WAS AWARE OF THE PETITIONERS’ CHILD’S INJURY AT THE TIME IT OCCURRED DOES NOT MEAN THE SCHOOL HAD TIMELY KNOWLEDGE OF THE POTENTIAL LAWSUIT; PETITIONERS’ APPLICATION TO DEEM A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM TIMELY SERVED SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
ATTORNEYS WHO HAD ACCEPTED A RETAINER TO CONTEST THE REMOVAL OF A GUARDIAN WERE NOT REQUIRED TO RETURN THE RETAINER BECAUSE IT WAS PAID FROM THE INCAPACITATED PERSON’S FUNDS, NO PROOF THE ATTORNEYS WERE AWARE OF THE SOURCE OF THE FUNDS, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).
IN THIS LADDER-FALL CASE, DEFENDANT PROPERTY MANAGER DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF CONTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE DANGEROUS CONDITION OR THAT IT LACKED CONTROL OVER THE WORK SITE; THE LABOR LAW 200 AND COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; IN ADDITION PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT).
ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT WAS AMBIVALENT ABOUT WHEN HE WAS SERVED, THE MOTION TO DISMISS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED ON THAT GROUND, IT IS PLAINTIFF’S BURDEN TO DEMONSTRATE A DEFENDANT WAS TIMELY SERVED WITH A SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

PLAINTIFF COULD NOT IDENTIFY THE CAUSE OF HER STAIRCASE FALL, DEFENDANT’S... ALTHOUGH THE CHILD SUPPORT INCOME FOR TWO CHILDREN IN COLLEGE WAS COUNTED AS...