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DENIAL OF PAROLE MANIFESTED IRRATIONALITY BORDERING ON IMPROPRIETY (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined denying petitioner parole was “irrational.” The proper remedy is a new parole nearing, not granting parole in a court ruling (as Supreme Court did). Petitioner, now 51, was convicted of felony murder when she was very young. She had driven the car to where her husband was staying. A passenger in the car shot and killed her husband. The jury found petitioner did not intend that her husband be killed. Petitioner has been a model prisoner for decades:

The commissioners failed to appreciate that petitioner’s murder conviction was not for intentional murder, but rather for second-degree felony murder. The felony murder rule, of course, provides that a person is guilty of second-degree murder when, “[a]cting either alone or with one or more other persons, [she] commits or attempts to commit [violent crimes including] burglary, . . . and, in the course of and in furtherance of such crime or of immediate flight therefrom, [she], or another participant, . . . causes the death of a person other than one of the participants” … . In essence, and particularly in the context of a burglary conviction, the felony murder rule imposes strict and vicarious liability for a killing that one did not intend, provided that it was the result of an enumerated felony that one did intentionally commit. Intent to kill plays no role in a finding of felony murder … .

At the parole hearing, petitioner nonetheless accepted responsibility for her “choices and decisions that led to a chain of events that led to the death of [her] husband.” Far from showing any lack of insight into her crime, petitioner’s testimony at the parole hearing was truthful, accurate, and consistent with what the jury found happened in 1991.

Accordingly, respondent’s determination denying petitioner parole manifested “irrationality bordering on impropriety,” warranting granting the petition to vacate the denial of parole … . Matter of Kellogg v New York State Bd. of Parole, 2018 NY Slip Op 01425, First Dept 3-6-18

CRIMINAL LAW (DENIAL OF PAROLE MANIFESTED IRRATIONALITY BORDERING ON IMPROPRIETY (FIRST DEPT))/PAROLE (DENIAL OF PAROLE MANIFESTED IRRATIONALITY BORDERING ON IMPROPRIETY (FIRST DEPT))

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