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UNDER THE LAW AT THE TIME OF THE OFFENSE, DEFENDANT COULD NOT BE SENTENCED TO ADDITIONAL INCARCERATION FOR A VIOLATION OF HIS CONDITIONAL DISCHARGE IN THIS DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED CASE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined, under law at the time of the offense, defendant should not have been sentenced to additional incarceration for a violation of his conditional discharge in this driving while intoxicated case:

After he served his jail term, a declaration of delinquency was filed in 2015, claiming that he violated his conditional discharge by operating a vehicle without an ignition interlock device. In 2016, defendant admitted to violating the terms of his conditional discharge, and County Court revoked the conditional discharge and sentenced him to an additional aggregate prison term of 1 to 3 years, to be followed by three years of conditional discharge. Defendant appeals.

The People concede, and we agree, that pursuant to our recent decision in People v Coon (156 AD3d 105 [2017]), the sentence of imprisonment imposed upon defendant’s violation of the terms of his conditional discharge must be vacated. “A defendant must be sentenced according to the law as it existed at the time that he or she committed the offense and, at the time defendant operated a vehicle without an ignition interlock device, the applicable law did not allow for the imposition of an additional period of imprisonment” … . People v Arvidson, 2018 NY Slip Op 01682, Third Dept 3-15-18

CRIMINAL LAW (DWI, UNDER THE LAW AT THE TIME OF THE OFFENSE, DEFENDANT COULD NOT BE SENTENCED TO ADDITIONAL INCARCERATION FOR A VIOLATION OF HIS CONDITIONAL DISCHARGE IN THIS DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED CASE (THIRD DEPT))/DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED (VIOLATION OF CONDITIONAL DISCHARGE, UNDER THE LAW AT THE TIME OF THE OFFENSE, DEFENDANT COULD NOT BE SENTENCED TO ADDITIONAL INCARCERATION FOR A VIOLATION OF HIS CONDITIONAL DISCHARGE IN THIS DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED CASE (THIRD DEPT))/SENTENCING (DWI, VIOLATION OF CONDITIONAL DISCHARGE,  UNDER THE LAW AT THE TIME OF THE OFFENSE, DEFENDANT COULD NOT BE SENTENCED TO ADDITIONAL INCARCERATION FOR A VIOLATION OF HIS CONDITIONAL DISCHARGE IN THIS DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED CASE (THIRD DEPT))/CONDITIONAL DISCHARGE, VIOLATION OF (DWI, UNDER THE LAW AT THE TIME OF THE OFFENSE, DEFENDANT COULD NOT BE SENTENCED TO ADDITIONAL INCARCERATION FOR A VIOLATION OF HIS CONDITIONAL DISCHARGE IN THIS DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED CASE (THIRD DEPT))

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