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ALTHOUGH FATHER COULD NOT SEEK MODIFICATION OF A NEW JERSEY SUPPORT ORDER UNDER THE UNIFORM INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT (UIFSA) HE COULD SEEK MODIFICATION UNDER THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT FOR CHILD SUPPORT ORDERS ACT (FFCCSOA) WHICH PREEMPTS THE UIFSA (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined that, although father could not seek modification of an out of state support order under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), he could seek modification under the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act (FFCCSOA), which was deemed to preempt the UIFSA:

In order to modify an out-of-state child support order under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act ([UIFSA] Family Ct Act art 5-B), the order must be registered in New York and, in relevant part, the following conditions must be present: “(i) neither the child, nor the obligee who is an individual, nor the obligor resides in the issuing state; (ii) a petitioner who is a nonresident of this state seeks modification; and (iii) the respondent is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the tribunal of this state” … . Although the New Jersey child support order was registered in New York, the father is the petitioner and he is a resident of New York. Therefore, under the UIFSA, the father could not properly bring the petition for modification of the New Jersey child support order in New York. The father could, however, properly bring the petition for modification in New York under the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act … . Under the FFCCSOA, a New York court may modify an out-of-state child support order if “the court has jurisdiction to make such a child support order pursuant to [28 USC § 1738B] subsection (i)” and, in relevant part, “the court of the other State no longer has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of the child support order because that State no longer is the child’s State or the residence of any individual contestant” … . Here, neither the parties nor the child continued to reside in New Jersey, and New Jersey therefore ceased to have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction … .

Although the UIFSA and the FFCCSOA “have complementary policy goals and should be read in tandem”… , the UIFSA and the FFCCSOA conflict when applied to these facts, and we conclude that the FFCCSOA preempts the UIFSA here. The FFCCSOA “is so comprehensive in scope that it is inferable that Congress intended to fully occupy the field of its subject matter” … . Matter of Reynolds v Evans, 2018 NY Slip Op 02077, Fourth Dept 3-23-18

FAMILY LAW (SUPPORT, ALTHOUGH FATHER COULD NOT SEEK MODIFICATION OF A NEW JERSEY SUPPORT ORDER UNDER THE UNIFORM INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT (UIFSA) HE COULD SEEK MODIFICATION UNDER THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT FOR CHILD SUPPORT ORDERS ACT (FFCCSOA) WHICH PREEMPTS THE UIFSA (FOURTH DEPT))/SUPPORT (FAMILY LAW, ALTHOUGH FATHER COULD NOT SEEK MODIFICATION OF A NEW JERSEY SUPPORT ORDER UNDER THE UNIFORM INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT (UIFSA) HE COULD SEEK MODIFICATION UNDER THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT FOR CHILD SUPPORT ORDERS ACT (FFCCSOA) WHICH PREEMPTS THE UIFSA (FOURTH DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (FAMILY LAW, PREEMPTION, ALTHOUGH FATHER COULD NOT SEEK MODIFICATION OF A NEW JERSEY SUPPORT ORDER UNDER THE UNIFORM INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT (UIFSA) HE COULD SEEK MODIFICATION UNDER THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT FOR CHILD SUPPORT ORDERS ACT (FFCCSOA) WHICH PREEMPTS THE UIFSA (FOURTH DEPT))/PREEMPTION (FAMILY LAW, SUPPORT, ALTHOUGH FATHER COULD NOT SEEK MODIFICATION OF A NEW JERSEY SUPPORT ORDER UNDER THE UNIFORM INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT (UIFSA) HE COULD SEEK MODIFICATION UNDER THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT FOR CHILD SUPPORT ORDERS ACT (FFCCSOA) WHICH PREEMPTS THE UIFSA (FOURTH DEPT))/UNIFORM INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT (ALTHOUGH FATHER COULD NOT SEEK MODIFICATION OF A NEW JERSEY SUPPORT ORDER UNDER THE UNIFORM INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT (UIFSA) HE COULD SEEK MODIFICATION UNDER THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT FOR CHILD SUPPORT ORDERS ACT (FFCCSOA) WHICH PREEMPTS THE UIFSA (FOURTH DEPT))/FULL FAITH AND CREDIT FOR CHILD SUPPORT ORDERS ACT ( ALTHOUGH FATHER COULD NOT SEEK MODIFICATION OF A NEW JERSEY SUPPORT ORDER UNDER THE UNIFORM INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT (UIFSA) HE COULD SEEK MODIFICATION UNDER THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT FOR CHILD SUPPORT ORDERS ACT (FFCCSOA) WHICH PREEMPTS THE UIFSA (FOURTH DEPT))

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