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THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY (1) WAS AN AT-WILL EMPLOYEE AND (2) MAY NOT BE PAID WITHIN ONE YEAR DID NOT RENDER THE ORAL CONTRACT ENTITLING PLAINTIFF TO LEGAL FEES VOID UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS, BREACH OF IMPLIED CONTRACT AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT CAUSES WERE PROPERLY PLED IN THE ALTERNATIVE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined plaintiff’s breach of an oral contract cause of action properly survived a motion to dismiss. Plaintiff was an at-will employee of a law firm and sought to enforce an oral agreement entitling him to 50% of the fees generated by work he brought in. In addition the court noted that the breach of an implied contract and unjust enrichment were properly pled in the alternative:

The statute of frauds (General Obligations Law § 5-701[a][1]) does not bar the alleged oral agreement between plaintiff and defendant law firm, pursuant to which the firm agreed to pay plaintiff 50% of the legal fees it earned on cases that he procured or originated and performed work on. In pertinent part, the statute renders void an agreement that “[b]y its terms is not to be performed within one year from the making thereof.” The fact that plaintiff was an at-will employee, i.e., he could be terminated at any time … , made the oral agreement capable of completion within the one-year period … . The fact that legal fees earned during the one-year period would not be paid until after the period had ended did not make the agreement incapable of completion within the period … .

Plaintiff’s allegations, supplemented by email and affidavits by other associates at the firm attesting to a course of dealing, state a cause of action against the law firm for breach of implied contract…  and unjust enrichment… . These causes of action are properly pleaded in the alternative … . Goldfarb v Romano, 2018 NY Slip Op 02411, First Dept 4-5-18

​CONTRACT LAW (STATUTE OF FRAUDS, THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFF (1) WAS AN AT-WILL EMPLOYEE AND (2) MAY NOT BE PAID WITHIN ONE YEAR DID NOT RENDER THE ORAL CONTRACT ENTITLING PLAINTIFF TO LEGAL FEES VOID UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS, BREACH OF IMPLIED CONTRACT AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT CAUSES WERE PROPERLY PLED IN THE ALTERNATIVE (FIRST DEPT))/STATUTE OF FRAUDS (THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFF (1) WAS AN AT-WILL EMPLOYEE AND (2) MAY NOT BE PAID WITHIN ONE YEAR DID NOT RENDER THE ORAL CONTRACT ENTITLING PLAINTIFF TO LEGAL FEES VOID UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS, BREACH OF IMPLIED CONTRACT AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT CAUSES WERE PROPERLY PLED IN THE ALTERNATIVE (FIRST DEPT))/ORAL CONTRACT (STATUTE OF FRAUDS, THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFF (1) WAS AN AT-WILL EMPLOYEE AND (2) MAY NOT BE PAID WITHIN ONE YEAR DID NOT RENDER THE ORAL CONTRACT ENTITLING PLAINTIFF TO LEGAL FEES VOID UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS, BREACH OF IMPLIED CONTRACT AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT CAUSES WERE PROPERLY PLED IN THE ALTERNATIVE (FIRST DEPT))/IMPLIED CONTRACT (THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFF (1) WAS AN AT-WILL EMPLOYEE AND (2) MAY NOT BE PAID WITHIN ONE YEAR DID NOT RENDER THE ORAL CONTRACT ENTITLING PLAINTIFF TO LEGAL FEES VOID UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS, BREACH OF IMPLIED CONTRACT AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT CAUSES WERE PROPERLY PLED IN THE ALTERNATIVE (FIRST DEPT))/UNJUST ENRICHMENT  (THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFF (1) WAS AN AT-WILL EMPLOYEE AND (2) MAY NOT BE PAID WITHIN ONE YEAR DID NOT RENDER THE ORAL CONTRACT ENTITLING PLAINTIFF TO LEGAL FEES VOID UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS, BREACH OF IMPLIED CONTRACT AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT CAUSES WERE PROPERLY PLED IN THE ALTERNATIVE (FIRST DEPT))/EMPLOYMENT LAW (ORAL CONTRACT, STATUTE OF FRAUDS, THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFF (1) WAS AN AT-WILL EMPLOYEE AND (2) MAY NOT BE PAID WITHIN ONE YEAR DID NOT RENDER THE ORAL CONTRACT ENTITLING PLAINTIFF TO LEGAL FEES VOID UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS, BREACH OF IMPLIED CONTRACT AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT CAUSES WERE PROPERLY PLED IN THE ALTERNATIVE (FIRST DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (EMPLOYMENT LAW, ORAL CONTRACT, STATUTE OF FRAUDS, THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFF (1) WAS AN AT-WILL EMPLOYEE AND (2) MAY NOT BE PAID WITHIN ONE YEAR DID NOT RENDER THE ORAL CONTRACT ENTITLING PLAINTIFF TO LEGAL FEES VOID UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS, BREACH OF IMPLIED CONTRACT AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT CAUSES WERE PROPERLY PLED IN THE ALTERNATIVE (FIRST DEPT))

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THE SCAFFOLD COLLAPSED ENTITLING PLAINTIFF TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION; THE HEARSAY SUBMITTED IN OPPOSITION DID NOT DEFEAT THE MOTION (FIRST DEPT). ​
THE PRESENTENCE INTERVIEW WAS CANCELLED DUE TO TECHNICAL DIFFICULTIES; THEREFORE THE PRESENTENCE REPORT WAS DEVOID OF INFORMATION ABOUT DEFENDANT’S EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT, HEALTH STATUS, MENTAL HEALTH AND DEFENDANT’S MOTIVE; ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT WAS SENTENCED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PLEA AGREEMENT, THE DEFICIENT PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION AND REPORT REQUIRED VACATION OF THE SENTENCE (FIRST DEPT).
FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE RULED ON MOTHER’S PETITION TO MODIFY CUSTODY WITHOUT HOLDING A HEARING, FAMILY COURT IMPROPERLY RELIED SOLELY UPON AN IN CAMERA INTERVIEW WITH THE CHILD AND UNSWORN DOCUMENTS FROM MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES AND THERAPISTS (FIRST DEPT).
THE JUDGE DID NOT MAKE THE REQUIRED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW BEFORE DETERMINING DEFENDANT’S SORA RISK-LEVEL; MATTER REMITTED (SECOND DEPT). ​
ALTHOUGH DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE IS ADMISSIBLE NOTWITHSTANDING THE DEAD MAN’S STATUTE, HERE THE DECEDENT’S SIGNATURE ON THE GUARANTY WAS NOT AUTHENTICATED BY SOMEONE OTHER THAN AN INTERESTED WITNESS; THEREFORE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE GUARANTY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).
THE NYC ADMINSTRATIVE CODE REQUIRES ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNERS TO REPAIR SIDEWALK FLAGS OVER 1/2 INCH; PLAINTIFF PRESENTED EVIDENCE THE FLAG WAS THREE INCHES; DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SIDEWALK SLIP AND FALL CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
THE DEFENDANTS’ FAILURE TO APPEAR AT THE SCHEDULED EXAMINATIONS UNDER OATH BREACHED A CONDITION PRECEDENT FOR INSURANCE COVERAGE ENTITLING THE INSURER TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ITS CAUSE OF ACTION FOR A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF NONCOVERAGE (FIRST DEPT).
CONNECTICUT SEXUAL ASSAULT STATUTE IS BROADER IN ITS REACH THAN NEW YORK COUNTERPARTS AND THEREFORE CANNOT SERVE AS A PREDICATE FELONY IN NEW YORK.

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