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CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE RENDERED THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION TIMELY, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the cause of action fOR medical malpractice stemming from an office visit within the limitations period was independently viable, and the continuous treatment doctrine rendered all the causes of action timely:

… [T]he claims based on allegations of negligent treatment during the January 2, 2013 office visit have an independent viability regardless of whether any prior alleged negligence is time-barred.

… [T]he record establishes that defendants provided continuous treatment to plaintiff for a condition, i.e., atrial fibrillation, until January 2, 2013; the alleged wrongful acts or omissions were related to that condition; and such treatment “gave rise to the . . . act, omission or failure” complained of … . Indeed, the record establishes that the alleged wrongful acts or omissions themselves ran continuously until January 2, 2013. We therefore reject defendants’ contention that the statute of limitations began to run at the time of the first prescription of Pradaxa on January 10, 2011. We conclude that the court erred in granting the motion inasmuch as this action was timely commenced within 2½ years of the cessation of defendants’ continuous treatment of plaintiff’s atrial fibrillation condition … . Phillips v Buffalo Heart Group, LLP, 2018 NY Slip Op 03055, Fourth Dept 4-27-18

​NEGLIGENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE RENDERED THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION TIMELY, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (FOURTH DEPT))/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE RENDERED THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION TIMELY, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (FOURTH DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE, CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE RENDERED THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION TIMELY, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (FOURTH DEPT))/CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE RENDERED THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION TIMELY, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (FOURTH DEPT))

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