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GENERAL CONTRACTOR DID NOT EXERCISE SUFFICIENT SUPERVISORY CONTROL OVER PLAINTIFF’S WORK TO BE LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 200 OR COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined plaintiff’s knee injury stemming from carrying a heavy beam down stairs was not covered under Labor Law 240 (1). The court further found that defendant general contractor (Talisen) did not exercise sufficient supervisory control over plaintiff’s work to be liable under Labor Law 200 or common law negligence:

Labor Law § 200 codifies the common-law duty imposed on an owner or a general contractor to provide construction site workers with a safe place to work … . Where a plaintiff’s claims implicate the means and methods of the work, an owner or a contractor will not be held liable under Labor Law § 200 unless it had the authority to supervise or control the performance of the work. General supervisory authority to oversee the progress of the work is insufficient to impose liability… . ” A defendant has the authority to control the work for the purposes of Labor Law § 200 when that defendant bears the responsibility for the manner in which the work is performed'” … . If the challenged means and methods of the work are those of a subcontractor, and the owner or contractor exercises no supervisory control over the work, no liability attaches under Labor Law § 200 or the common law … .

In this case, Talisen met its prima facie burden of demonstrating a lack of sufficient supervisory control over the plaintiff’s work to subject it to liability under either Labor Law § 200 or common-law negligence. In support of its motion, Talisen presented the deposition testimony of its project superintendent as well as the owner of Premier showing that decisions regarding the means and methods for carrying the beam were the responsibility of Premier. In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Sullivan v New York Athletic Club of City of N.Y., 2018 NY Slip Op 04591, Second Dept 6-20-18

​LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (GENERAL CONTRACTOR DID NOT EXERCISE SUFFICIENT SUPERVISORY CONTROL OVER PLAINTIFF’S WORK TO BE LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 200 OR COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE (SECOND DEPT))/GENERAL CONTRACTOR (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, GENERAL CONTRACTOR DID NOT EXERCISE SUFFICIENT SUPERVISORY CONTROL OVER PLAINTIFF’S WORK TO BE LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 200 OR COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE (SECOND DEPT))

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KNEE INJURY CAUSED BY CARRYING A HEAVY STEEL BEAM DOWN STAIRS IS NOT A COVERED... MOTION FOR A CHANGE OF VENUE ON DISCRETIONARY GROUNDS WAS MADE IN THE WRONG...