You are here: / / KNEE INJURY CAUSED BY CARRYING A HEAVY STEEL BEAM DOWN STAIRS IS NOT A...

KNEE INJURY CAUSED BY CARRYING A HEAVY STEEL BEAM DOWN STAIRS IS NOT A COVERED ACCIDENT UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1) (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, modifying Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on his Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action was properly granted and defendant’s (Premier’s) motion for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action should have been granted. Plaintiff injured his knee carrying a heavy steel beam down some stairs. The court held that the incident was not encompassed by Labor Law 240 (1):

… [T]he plaintiff did not establish his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, since he failed to demonstrate that his injury was caused by an elevation-related hazard encompassed by Labor Law § 240(1). The plaintiff’s evidence demonstrated that the cause of his injury was the weight of the beam he was carrying. The mere fact that the plaintiff was injured by the weight of a heavy object being lifted or carried does not give rise to liability pursuant to Labor Law § 240(1) … . The Court of Appeals has “repeatedly held, implicitly and explicitly, that it is not enough that a plaintiff’s injury flowed directly from the application of the force of gravity to an object or person, even where a device specified by the statute might have prevented the accident” … . Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1).

Premier established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action through evidence that the plaintiff was injured by the weight of the beam as opposed to an elevation-related risk … . Sullivan v New York Athletic Club of City of N.Y., 2018 NY Slip Op 04590, Second Dept 6-20-18

​LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (KNEE INJURY CAUSED BY CARRYING A HEAVY STEEL BEAM DOWN STAIRS IS NOT A COVERED ACCIDENT UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1) (SECOND DEPT))

You might also like
THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY PLAINTIFF DID NOT IDENTIFY THE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT’S SLIP AND FALL; DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS AN OUT-OF-POSSESSION LANDLORD PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE LANDLORD IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (SECOND DEPT). ​
THE DEFENSE EXPERT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO OFFER A SPECULATIVE CONCLUSION ABOUT HOW PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED WHICH WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD; PLANTIFF ALLEGED THE STEP STOOL SHE WAS STANDING ON COLLAPSED; THE DEFENSE EXPERT TESTIFIED SHE COULD HAVE FALLEN ONTO THE STOOL; THE DEFENSE VERDICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE (SECOND DEPT).
HOMEOWNER’S EXEMPTION TO LABOR LAW 241(6) APPLIED, NO EVIDENCE HOMEOWNERS SUPERVISED PLAINTIFF’S WORK, HOMEOWNERS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
More than One Possible Cause of Icy Condition Required Grant of Summary Judgment to Defendant
WHEN DETERMINING THE VALUE OF A PARTNERSHIP SHARE UPON DISSOLUTION, A MINORITY DISCOUNT CAN PROPERLY BE APPLIED TO A PARTNER WHO WRONGFULLY DISSOLVED THE PARTNERSHIP AND WHO DID NOT EXERCISE CONTROL OVER THE PARTNERSHIP AS A GOING CONCERN.
THE STOP OF DEFENDANT’S CAR WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE SUSPICION; THE REPORT THAT A SUSPICIOUS CAR WAS FOLLOWING SOMEONE DID NOT DESCRIBE THE CAR AND DEFENDANT WAS NOT FOLLOWING ANYONE WHEN STOPPED; THE PROOF AT THE SUPPRESSION HEARING DID NOT DEMONSTRATE DEFENDANT WAS TRESPASSING BY DRIVING ON THE PRIVATE ROAD, WHICH WAS THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE STOP RELIED UPON BY SUPREME COURT (SECOND DEPT).
NO REASONABLE JUSTIFICATION FOR FAILURE TO PRESENT DOCUMENTS WITH ORIGINAL MOTION, MOTION FOR LEAVE TO RENEW PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT’S RECKLESSNESS WAS THE SOLE LEGAL CAUSE OF... GENERAL CONTRACTOR DID NOT EXERCISE SUFFICIENT SUPERVISORY CONTROL OVER PLAINTIFF’S...